

HARIBHADRASŪRĪ'S
SAD-DARŚANA-SAMUCCAYA

K. S. S.

Edited with translation and critical notes

by

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FOREWORD

Bangalore University has undertaken the publication of text-books and reference books in different subjects. The editorial committee for Sanskrit recommended the publication of Śaḍ-Darśana Samuccaya of Haribhadrāsuri as a reference book for the Post-Graduate students of Sanskrit and Philosophy. Mr. M. Sivakumara Swamy of the Post-Graduate Department of Sanskrit has prepared an edition of this valuable Text of Indian Philosophy.

Sanskrit has been a repository of Indian Philosophy. Right from Upanisadic times great thinkers bestowed their thoughts on philosophical problems and developed different systems of thought. It is interesting to note that as early as 6th Century A.D. Haribhadrāsuri, a Jaina scholar, thought of the necessity of preparing this compendium of different systems of Indian Philosophy. This compendium has a reference value both as the earliest work of this kind and as an authentic summary of the early phases of different systems of Indian Philosophy.

Since the account given here is very brief, the Sanskrit Editorial Committee felt that this reference book be published with English translation and detailed critical notes so that the students will get full reference material. The translation and notes will be particularly helpful to philosophy students.

Bangalore University is anxious to provide text-books and reference books in all subjects. The Sanskrit Editorial Committee is planning to offer a few more books of this type. The University will be happy to publish them.

I record my appreciation of the work done by Sri. M. Sivakumara Swamy in preparing this edition and the committee's efforts in planning such useful books.

H. NARASIMHAIAH
Vice-Chancellor, Bangalore University.

PREFACE

We are happy to offer this edition of Sad-Darsana, Samucchaya of Haribhadrāsuri as a publication on behalf of the Post-Graduate Department of Sanskrit of Bangalore University. This edition with translation and critical notes in English, is prepared by Sri. M. Sivakumara Swamy of our Department for the Post-Graduate Students of Sanskrit and Philosophy and for the scholars interested in knowing the fundamentals of these systems.

Sad-Darsana Samucchaya is the earliest known compendium of different systems of Indian Philosophy. This was prepared nearly six centuries before the famous Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha of Madhavacharya. This indicates that the scholars of different systems took interest in the study of all systems quite early in the history of Indian Philosophical studies and wanted the beginners also to have a basic knowledge of different systems through such compendiums.

Haribhadrāsuri's selection of six systems and the method of handling the same reveals certain special features. He has selected Bauddha, Nyaya, Samkhya, Jaina, Vaisesika and Jaiminiya systems. He has also added Charvaka and justifies the enumeration of six on the ground that Nyaya and Vaisesika together constitute only one system. However, he has not treated them together or continuously.

The following special features of his selection of systems and method of treatment deserve our attention:

1. He has excluded the treatment of Vedanta system. Though the three well-known schools of Vedanta, viz., Advaita, Visistadvaita and Dvaita were not in vogue at his time, Vedanta-Sutras and some early commentaries on the same did exist. While he has included the Jaiminiya system connected with Vedic tradition, he has not included Vedanta system.

2. He describes the six systems selected by him as Astika (including Bauddha and Jaina). He considers only Charvaka as Nastika.

3. He adopts the criteria of Devata and Tattva to distinguish the Darsanas from each other. For the purpose of Devata, Sugata and Jina are considered as Devata in Bauddha and Jaina Systems, Siva as Devata for Nyaya, Vaishesika and Samkhya (Śesvara Samkhya) systems. No Sarvajna Devata is accepted in Jaiminiya system. The question of Devata does not arise in Charvaka. Thus his criterion of Devata to distinguish Darsana seems to be artificial and not quite justified. Probably with this criterion of Devata worked out by him he has described the six systems selected by him as 'Astika' which is also not quite in conformity with the continued tradition. In any case, he has a novel approach in this respect.

4. He mentions the nature and number of Pramāṇas accepted by each system, gives a brief account of the categories, mentions the special points of religious and ethical importance, and states the nature of Mokṣa or final liberation according to different systems.

5. He does not offer any criticism or does not make any adverse comments on any system. His purpose is to give an idea of the fundamentals of each system in respect of Pramāṇa and Pramēya. His treatment of Nyaya, Samkhya and Jaina is in greater detail while the treatment of other systems is brief.

6. It is difficult to ascertain the rationale behind the order of the treatment of the systems selected. Neither the number and nature of Pramāṇas, nor the metaphysical stand adopted by them as idealistic, realistic, etc., give sufficient clue for this order. Astika-Nastika demarcation, or non-Vedic-Vedic demarcation also do not give any clue. The

relative historical periods of the commencement of these systems is also quite uncertain. Jaina cannot be considered as later than Nyaya or Samkhya in point of beginning. Therefore, the relative historicity is also probably not the ground of the order. One can only presume that Bauddha that is idealistic is placed first, then Nyaya, Samkhya and Jaina that are realistic with an ascending degree of stress on realism in different aspects of metaphysical nature and relation of things, are placed in the same sequence and then Vaishesika that has affinity with Jaina in many respects is appended. Charvaka, of course, finds its place as an opponent of the basic stand of Darsanas in respect of the existence of soul and liberation.

This small treatise of 87 verses, written during such an early period as 6th or 7th century naturally gives a gist of these systems, drawing the information from the early texts of these systems and hence represents the early phase of these systems. This helps the understanding of some concepts and terms in their earlier usage, and to determine the early and later import of these concepts.

The editor Sri. M. Sivakumara Swamy who has been teaching this text to M.A. (Final) Darsana students for last five years has taken all pains to prepare an authentic translation and add detailed notes. He has given a historical resume of each system at the commencement of that system and has also given a brief account of major works and tenets. Thus this edition will be useful for the History of Darsana paper also. I am happy to record my appreciation of the good work done by him. We are glad to offer this in the series of text-books and reference books planned by the Post-Graduate Department of Sanskrit, Bangalore University.

Our beloved Vice-Chancellor Dr. H. Narasimhaiah is anxious to provide text-books and reference books in

all subjects. Being a keen student of Vedānta he has special affection for Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy. The Sanskrit Editorial Committee is receiving all encouragement from him in its task of bringing out such editions. I express our gratefulness to him.

I also take this opportunity to thank Sri. H. R. Dasegowda, Director, Prasaranga, and Sri. K. C. Shivappa, Deputy Director, for their interest and help in publishing this work.

I thank Bangalore Press for their prompt and faultless printing.

K. T. PANDURANGI

Chairman,

Editorial Committee for Sanskrit Texts.

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ṢAḌ-DARŚANASAMUCCAYA

AN

INTRODUCTION

‘Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya’ is, as the title itself indicates, an abstract of six systems of philosophy. By the term ‘ṣaḍdarśana’ we usually understand the six orthodox systems, viz., Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Uttara-mīmāṃsā. But the six systems dealt with by Haribhadrāsūri here are: Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Sāṅkhya, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika and Jaiminiya systems.

The term ‘ṣaḍdarśana’ is a misnomer, as one scholar rightly observes, because the list of six varies from one writer to the other. Thus, for instance, one list is made up of two Mīmāṃsās, two Sāṅkhyas and two Naiyāyikas (Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Uttaramīmāṃsā, Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya, Seśvara-Sāṅkhya, Ṣoḍaśapadārthākhyāyī-Naiyāyika and Saptapadārthākhyāyī-Naiyāyika). Another list is made up of Jaina and Lokāyata systems along with the four Bauddha systems, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. The orthodox list of the Hindus and Haribhadra’s list are already given above.

Haribhadrāsūri, the author of the ‘Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya’, is credited with titles like ‘Paramārhata’. Nothing is known about his parentage. It is said that he was a Brahmin and a priest of Jitāri, the king of Cittauḍ. A story is told regarding his conversion to Jainism. According to the story, Haribhadrāsūri once heard from a Jaina-devotee called Sākinī the following stanza:

“ चक्कीदुगं हरिपणागं चक्कणकेसवो चक्की ।

केसवचक्की केसव दुचक्की केसवचक्कीय ॥ ”

When he could not follow the meaning of the stanza, he approached the lady-ascetic. She declined to explain the meaning to him, but directed him to one Jinabhaṭṭasūri.

The Jaina-monk made it clear to him that unless one became well-versed in Jaina teachings one could never understand the meaning of that stanza. Haribhadra at once relinquished his earlier faith and embraced Jainism. This tradition seems to be the basis of the assumption that Haribhadrāsūri was a Brahmin converted to Jainism.¹

Regarding the date of Haribhadrāsūri, there are a few conjectures. According to Jaina-tradition, which Max Müller takes for granted, Haribhadrāsūri died in 1055 of the Vira era. This corresponds to 585 of Vikram Samvat, which is equal to 528 A.D. Many scholars believe that he flourished in the beginning of 6th century A.D. Barth feels on the basis of what he calls 'more exact testimony' that Haribhadra belonged to 9th century A.D. Dr. Vidyabhushana assigns him to 12th century A.D.² An opinion is affloat among scholars that there were two Haribhadrās, one of 8th century A.D. and the other of 12th century A.D. But Winternitz has shown conclusively that there was only one Haribhadrāsūri, who cannot be pushed to so late a date as 12th century A.D.

So far as his works are concerned, Haribhadra is famous as the author of 1400 Prabhandhas or Prakaraṇas. Maṇibhadra, a commentator of 'Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya', describes him as 'caturdaśaśataprakaraṇopakṛtajinadharmah', 'Anekāntajayapatākā', 'Lalitavistara', 'Caityavandanavṛtti', 'Darśanasaptatikā', 'Munipati-cāritra', etc., are among the other works assigned to him.

Barth's statement³ given below would give an all-comprehensive description of the author and his work, 'Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya':

1. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 49; Barth : *Indian Antiquary*, 1895, p. 66; Winternitz : *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 479; Max Müller, *Six Systems*, pp. 438-9.

2. Quoted by Mishra in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, I.

3. *Indian Antiquary*, 1895, p. 66.

"Haribhadra who, according to tradition, died in A.D. 529, but by more exact testimony, in 9th century A.D. and who had several homonyms, was a Brahmin converted to Jainism. He is famous still as the author of 1400 Prabhandhas (chapters or works) and seems to have been one of the first to introduce Sanskrit language into the scholastic literature of the Śvetāmbara Jains. By the six systems the Brahmins understand the two Mīmāṃsās, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Haribhadra, on the other hand, expounds under this title, very curtly, in 87 ślokas, the essential principles of the Buddhists, the Jainas, the followers of Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā. He thus selects his own school and those with whom the Jainas had the closest affinities and puts them in between the schools of their greatest enemies, the Buddhists and the Ritualists of the school of Jaimini". Dr. S. Radhakrishnan⁴ considers 'Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya' as an example, along with the 'Sarvaśarāṅga-saṅgraha' of some conscious efforts by Indian thinkers to deal with several systems in a continuous manner.

The summary of each system of Philosophy in Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya is very brief. Haribhadrāsūri summarises each Darśana in 8 to 18 stanzas, the smallest section being that of Bauddhadarśana in 8 stanzas and the largest being that of Nyāyadarśana in 18 stanzas. Even in this brief summary the author particularly mentions the number of Pramāṇas accepted by each system and explains their nature as the essential factors distinguishing each system from the other. He also gives a very brief and significant account of Prameyas. This is intended to be an ontological basis of distinguishing one system from others.

Haribhadrāsūri draws his material from very ancient texts of each Darśana. The terms and methodology employed in the treatment of each system represent the early phase of

4. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 49.

that system. The later developments of each system are outside the scope of this work. This helps us to distinguish that phase from the later phase of each system. For instance, the section on Nyāyadarśana is essentially an epitome of Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya. The brief account of Bauddhadarśana represents the phase of Buddhist philosophy before the development of its several schools. Sāṅkhya-darśana section draws upon Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Thus this small text not only helps to have a compact view of the systems treated but also gives a glimpse of the earliest phase of those systems.

This edition is intended for the use of University students. Therefore the following method is followed:

(1) A brief history of each system treated in this work is given with a view to acquainting the students with the development of each system.

(2) A brief introduction leading to the content of each stanza is intended to focus the attention of the students on the different topics covered in a system.

(3) A lucid translation in English of the stanza or stanzas is given.

(4) This is followed by an exhaustive critical notes explaining the important terms in the light of the source Sūtras and Bhāṣyas of each system and giving, wherever necessary, the historical developments of the tenets of each.

It is hoped that this will meet the requirements of University students and humbly rise to the generous expectations of the learned people.

I am grateful to the authorities of the University for giving me an opportunity to prepare an edition of this work and publishing the same. I am also thankful to Sri. K. T. Pandurangi, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, for having gone through the manuscript of this work and made valuable suggestions in making this a useful reference book. I thank the Bangalore Press for getting this work neatly printed.

M. SIVAKUMARA SWAMY

षड्दर्शनसमुच्चयः

ṢAḌ-DARŚANASAMUCCAYAḤ

षड्दर्शनसमुच्चयः

MAṄGALAM

Intent on examining the principles and means of right knowledge in the six systems selected by him, Haribhadrāsūri introduces the subject-matter of his work by way of offering salutations to Vardhamāna Mahāvīra:

सदृशं जिनं नत्वा वीरं स्याद्वाददेशकम् ।

सर्वदर्शनवाच्योऽर्थः संक्षेपेण निगद्यते

॥ १ ॥

Salutations to Jina (Vardhamāna Mahāvīra) who has the true philosophic vision, who is brave and who is the expounder of the 'Doctrine of May-be' (Syādvāda). I give an exposition in brief of the subject pertaining to all systems of philosophy. (1)

The word 'artha' stands for 'abhidheya'—subject-matter. 'Nigadyate'—that subject is dealt with here. What is that subject? 'Sarvadarśanavācya'rthaḥ'—'Sarvāṇi ca tāni' darśanāni, Bauddha-Naiyāyika-Jaina-Vaiśeṣika-Sāṃkhya-Jaiminiyādīni, teṣāṃ matāni, teṣu vācyaḥ arthaḥ'—the subject is pertaining to the systems of philosophy such as Bauddha, etc. Here the author proposes to summarise their views (matas).

The word 'darśana' means 'true philosophic vision'. [√drś + lyuṭ (bhāve) (युवोरनाकौ) - 'drśyate iti'] It is used in this sense in Kaṇāda's 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra (IX. ii. 13). It also means 'a system of philosophy'—'Drśyate jñāyate ātmā anena iti darśanam'. [√drś + lyuṭ (karmanī)-ana]. The author uses the word in both the senses.

Each of the viśeṣaṇas given to Jina is significant. Jina (Mahāvīra) is 'Saddarśana'—possesses true philosophic vision. He is 'Vīra'—brave in spirit, as he assumes the ferocity of a soldier in refuting the views of his adversaries while establishing his own stand—'Pramānavaktavyasya

parapakṣocchedādisubhaṭavṛttivāt'. He is 'Vira' also because of his power to break the series of karma and to conquer all passions—'Vidāraṇāt karmatateḥ, rāgādije-
trivāt'. The third viśeṣaṇa, 'Syādvādadeśakam' alludes to the famous Jaina doctrine of 'Syādvāda'. 'Syādvikalpo
vādaḥ Syādvādaḥ, tam diśati upadiśatiti Syādvādadeśakaḥ'.
'Syādvāda', the doctrine of may-be, holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, the affirmation made from whatever standpoint (naya) cannot be regarded as absolute. A thing may be existent from one standpoint; it may be non-existent from another point of view. Thus it may be eternal or non-eternal, may be expressible or inexpressible, may have a general aspect or a particular aspect (sat or asat, nitya or anitya, abhilāpya or anabhilāpya, sāmānyātmaka or viśeṣātmaka). For instance, if we say, 'Ghaṭo'sti', it is to be noted that ghaṭa is existent here in a particular place; but it is non-existent in another place. Hence the affirmation that 'ghaṭa is' is not absolutely but only relatively true with regard to a particular place. It is, therefore, more correct to say 'ghaṭaḥ syādasti'—may be that ghaṭa is. Syādvāda-argument involves seven steps as follows:—

- (1) All can be affirmed only as may be (syādasti).
- (2) All can be denied only as may not be (syānnāsti).
- (3) All can be both affirmed and denied as may be and may not be (syādasti syānnāsti).
- (4) All can be expressed as 'may be expressed' (syādvaktavya).
- (5) All can be declared inexpressible only as may be inexpressible (syādavaktavya).
- (6) All can be affirmed, denied and expressed only as may be, may not be and may be expressed. (syādasti syānnāsti syādvaktavya).

(7) All can be affirmed, denied, expressed and declared as inexpressible only as may be, may not be, may be expressed and may not be expressed (syādasti syānnāsti syādvaktavya syādavaktavya).

This analysis is called 'Saptabhaṅgī', the analysis in seven steps. Thus, according to Jainadarśana, reality does not exclude contradictory features. This amounts to the saying that reality is indeterminate in nature (anekānta).

The author proposes thus—'Sarvadarśanavācya'rthaḥ saṃkṣepeṇa nigadyate'. How many and which are those Darśanas? What is the basis of distinction of one Darśana from another? Answers to these questions are to be met with in the next two stanzas:

दर्शनानि षडेवात्र मूलभेदव्यपेक्षया ।

देवतातत्त्वभेदेन ज्ञातव्यानि मनीषिभिः

॥ २ ॥

बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा ।

जैमिनीयं च नामानि दर्शनानाममून्यहो

॥ ३ ॥

The systems of philosophy are only six on the basis of fundamental differences. They are to be comprehended by the learned with their distinctions in regard to the deities and principles. (2)

Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Sāṃkhya, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika and Jaiminiya—these are the names of the systems of philosophy. (3)

The word 'eva' (St. 2-Ṣaḍeva) is to draw our attention to the number of systems as six here. Although the systems are many due to divisions and subdivisions in each system, they can all be included under each system of which they are the branches. Thus, for instance, the Buddhas have several systems as Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. But all these can be included under the Bauddhadarśana, taking into consideration certain funda-

mental principles underlying all of them. That is what the author means when he says—'mūlabhedavyapekṣayā'—mūlabhedānāśrityaiva tāni darśanāni ṣaḍveti jñeyāni, natu antarabhedānāśritya. The fundamental distinctions are only six and hence there are only six Darśanas.

What are those fundamentals by which one Darśana can be distinguished from another Darśana? To this the author says—'devatā-tattva-bhēdena' That is, the Darśanas are to be distinguished from one another by their respective deities accepted in the system and basic principles; devatāḥ—the deities of the systems (Darśanādhiṣṭāyikāḥ) and tattvāni—the principles leading to emancipation (mokṣasādhakāni rahasyāni) or categories (Padārthāḥ). To these another means of distinction is to be added and that is—'Pramāṇabheda' or the differences in the number and nature of Pramāṇas accepted by each system. All Darśanas pay conscious attention to the problems of 'what' and 'how' we know, the nature and means of right knowledge (Prameya and Pramāṇa). The number of Pramāṇas is a topic on which wide differences of view exist among the systems.

Here the author is giving us a clue to the method adopted by him in dealing with the systems. He deals with the devatās, tattvas and pramāṇas pertaining to each Darśana. It is on the basis of these three that he distinguishes one Darśana from another.

1. BAUDDHA-DARŚANA

The history of Buddhism falls into two phases, viz., the early religious phase and the later philosophical phase. In the former phase, the path of good conduct (Ācāra) has been clearly taught for the good of mankind. That was found in the sermons of Buddha and his disciples. The philosophical enquiry was not considered necessary during that stage. In the latter phase, i.e., the philosophical phase, the rudimentary philosophical ideas contained in Buddha's teachings on Ācāra were discovered and developed into philosophical doctrines.

Thus both the phases of Buddhism are based on the teachings of Buddha, the founder of this faith. The life and achievements of Buddha (448-368 B.C.) are too well known to require recounting again. As regards his teachings, they were orally transmitted to his disciples at various places he visited. They were collected during a few centuries after his death. The first attempt at collecting Buddha's teachings was made immediately after his death at a Buddhist council at Rājagṛha under the presidentship of Mahākāśyapa. It was during this council that the first two books of Buddhist Pali Canon, viz., Vinaya-piṭaka and Sutta-piṭaka, were collected with the assistance of Buddha's disciples Upāli and Ānanda respectively. A century later the second council was held at Vaiśālī. Then during the times of Aśoka and Kaṇiṣka two more councils (the third and the fourth) were held. During these councils the third book of Buddhist Canon, i.e., Abhidhamma-piṭaka, was finalised.

The Tripiṭaka is the collective name given to the three books of Buddhist Pali Canon, Vinaya-piṭaka, Sutta-piṭaka and Abhidhamma-piṭaka. Sutta-piṭaka is the collection of Buddha's sayings; Vinaya-piṭaka deals with Ācāra; and

Abhidhammapiṭaka contains philosophical ideas evolved from the Mātrkāś (Mātikās) in the Suttapiṭaka. It is in the Khuddakanikāya (the last section) of the Suttapiṭaka that we find the famous Dhammapada in 423 gāthās and collection of Jātakas (550 stories connected with the previous lives of Buddha). Besides Tripiṭaka, Nāgasena's Milindapañhā has been regarded as an authoritative work on early Buddhism. The distinguishing feature of early Buddhism was its emphasis on śīla, samādhi and prajñā (Triratna). The important doctrines of early Buddhism are:

- (1) Four Noble Truths (Ārya-satya).
- (2) Doctrine of Dependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda).
- (3) Doctrine of 'No-self' (Nairātmyavāda);
- (4) The Doctrine that everything is a flux (Santāna).
- (5) The Doctrine that everything is an aggregate (Saṅghāta).

These doctrines were in a rudimentary form in the Tripiṭaka. These lacked emphasis and formal enunciation. The emphasis and formal enunciation were given in the later schools of Buddhism. As regards the schools of Buddhism, the number of those that sprang up in India itself was eighteen. They arose out of a great divergence of views among the followers of Buddhism. These later schools of Buddhism are broadly classified into two heads: the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. The word Hīnayāna refers to the schools of Theravāda (Sthaviravāda), while the word Mahāyāna refers to the schools arising from the tradition of the Mahāsāṅghikas. The fundamental difference between the two branches—which has a bearing on their names is that the ultimate aim of the follower of Hīnayāna is to attain his own Nirvāṇa, whereas that of the follower of Mahāyāna

is to seek the Nirvāṇa of all beings. Again in their ethical and philosophical outlook they differ widely. For instance, broadly speaking, the Hīnayāna believes in the reality of outward objects, while the Mahāyāna holds the opposite view. The Hīnayāna (Theravāda or Sarvāstivāda) has two main schools called Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika. The two main schools of Mahāyāna are Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) and Mādhyamika (Śūnyavāda).

The Sautrāntika are called so, because they lay stress on the Suttanta (Sūtrānta) doctrine of the Suttapiṭaka (Sūtrapiṭaka). Kumāralabdha (200 A.D.) is said to be the founder of this school. The Vaibhāṣika school derives its name from the second name given to Kātyāyanīputra's work called Jñānaprasthānaśāstra. Vasubandhu (280–350 A.D.), the author of Abhidharma-Kośaśāstra, Dinnāga (345–425 A.D.), the author of Pramāṇasamuccaya and Dharma-kīrti (635–650 A.D.), the author of Nyāyabindu, are the chief exponents of the Vaibhāṣika school. The most important difference between the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools is that the former believes that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred, while the latter believes that external objects, could be directly perceived. The dividing line between them in other matters is very thin.

The two schools mentioned above are called the realistic schools of Buddhism. The other two schools, viz., Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) and Mādhyamika (Śūnyavāda) are called the idealistic schools. The chief exponents of Yogācāra school were Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (a Vaibhāṣika converted to Yogācāra by Asaṅga, his brother). Asaṅga is the author of Laṅkāvatāra, Mahāyānasūtra and other works. Vasubandhu's Abhidarmakośa is an authoritative work on Buddhist doctrine in general and Yogācāra philosophy in particular. With regard to Mādhyamika school, the most powerful exponent is Nāgārjuna, whose work,

Mūlamadhyamakārikā, has been commented upon by several scholars such as Āryadeva (220–225 A.D.), Kumārajīva, etc.

The important writers of the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools referred to above have been influenced by Aśvaghoṣa (I cent A.D.), whose work called Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra is regarded as the most important work unfolding the fundamental teaching of the Mahāyāna which branched off into Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools. Aśvaghoṣa's Śāstra centres round two points: (i) that reality is indescribable and (ii) that reality is consciousness itself. The first point is the basis of the Mādhyamika school and the second point is the basis of the Yogācāra school. Details of the various doctrines of these schools cannot be given in this brief account.

Thus all students of Buddhism know that it began as a religion and was forced, not long after, to become a philosophy because it had to defend itself against the metaphysical schools of the Hindus and the Jainas. In his treatment, Haribhadrāsūri, according to his professed plan, does not enter into the technicalities of the contending schools of the Bauddhas, but restricts himself to the original creed of Buddhism. Although it is difficult to reconstruct the original form of the creed as taught by Buddha, yet, given a certain scope to hypothesis, we can formulate his chief teachings from the Pali-Buddhistic canon. The Four Noble Truths (Ariya-Saccas), which, according to the Pāli Canon, form the subject-matter of the very first sermon delivered by the Buddha at Benares, are the fundamental teaching and are accepted as such by Haribhadrāsūri in his brief treatment of the Bauddha-darśana. After explaining these Truths, the author proceeds to deal with Pramāṇas recognised by the Bauddha system. The author refers to the deity and the tattvas in the following stanza:

तत्र बौद्धमते तावद्देवता सुगतः किल ।

चतुर्णामार्यसत्यानां दुःखादीनां प्ररूपकः

॥ ४ ॥

There, in the Bauddha system, the presiding deity is Sugata (the Buddha), who is the propounder of the Four Noble Truths, Evil, etc. (4)

The name 'Bauddha-darśana' is derived from the fact that the Buddha is the presiding deity (devatā) of this system—'Buddho devatā'syeti Bauddha-darśanam'. It is also called 'Sugatadarśanā'.

The tattvas or the principles of this darśana are the Four Noble Truths (Ārya-Satyas), namely, Duḥkha-Evil (Sorrow), Samudaya—the Source of Evil, Mārga—Means of overcoming Evil and Nirodha—Removal of Evil.

In the doctrine of Four Noble Truths, we find an attempt at ascertaining the nature of Evil (Duḥkha), discovering the cause of Evil (Samudaya), setting out on the path of overcoming it (Mārga) and eradicating it (Nirodha). This attempt is the crystallisation of the search which involves the tracing of the causal relation. The starting point of this search as given in the 'Samyutta-nikāya' (II. 2.) is the reflection that this existence is pain. Trying to find a cause for it, Buddha found a chain of causes starting from Jāti and ending with Avidyā. This has come down to us as the "doctrine of causal connection or dependent origination" (Pratītyasamutpāda). It is a chain of twelve causes—Jarāmaraṇa—Jāti,—Bhava—Upādāna—Tṛṣṇā—Vedanā—Sparsa — Śaḍāyatana—Nāmarūpa—Vijñāna—Saṃskāra—Avidyā. The misery of decay and death (Jarāmaraṇa) is there where there is birth (Jāti); the birth could only be if there were previous existence (Bhava); there could not be existence unless there was deep attachment (Upādāna); this Upādāna is due to desire (Tṛṣṇā); desire is due to feeling (Vedanā); feeling is caused by sense-contact (Sparsa); there

are six sense-contacts and these are due to six fields of contact (Ṣaḍāyatana); Ṣaḍāyatana depend upon mind and body (Nāmarūpa); mind and body could not be without consciousness (Vijñāna); consciousness is due to conformations or the fund of sins and merits (Saṃskāra); and Saṃskāra can only be if there were ignorance (Avidyā). In this chain, Avidyā is the darkness of delusion in which there would be no distinction between sāra (essential) and asāra (non-essential); Saṃskāra is the collection of sins and merits; Vijñāna is the germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there; Nāma-rūpa is the body and mind; Sparśa is the sense-contact with the object; Trṣṇā is the desire to enjoy it; Upādāna is the deep attachment caused by desire; Bhava is the previous existence which grows out of attachment; Jāti is birth; Jarāmaraṇa is sorrow or evil.

Now the author explains the first Noble Truth, Duḥkha :

दुःखं संसारिणः स्कन्धास्ते पञ्च प्रकीर्त्तिताः ।

विज्ञानं वेदना संज्ञा संस्कारो रूपमेव च

॥ ५ ॥

Sorrow or evil is the totality of the ever-waxing and ever-waning aggregates; these aggregates are said to be five as consciousness, feeling, conceptual knowledge, mental state and physical form. (5)

According to Buddha, life is sorrow or evil. This sorrow is Jarāmaraṇa which is caused by Jāti or birth. Jāti is the appearance of the body or the totality of five Skandhas (aggregates), which causes sorrow and hence, it is sorrow itself by 'abhedopacāra' between the cause and the effect.

The word 'skandha' means the trunk of a tree. It is generally used to mean a group or an aggregate. Here the 'Skandhas' are the aggregates of physical and psychical elements. They are divided into five classes :

(1) Vijñāna-skandha—Consciousness, the aggregate of consciousness produced in the womb due to past 'Karma' and the consciousness of the previous existence;

(2) Vedanā-skandha—aggregate of feeling, pleasurable, painful and indifferent;

(3) Saṃjñā-skandha—Conceptual knowledge, an aggregate of specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow, the red, etc;

(4) Saṃskāra-skandha—aggregate of synthetic mental states, etc., and

(5) Rūpa-skandha—aggregate of four elements, the body, the senses, the sense-data, etc.

Of these, Vijñāna is the product of the past 'Karmas' of the dying man and of his past consciousness too. The last thoughts and his consciousness produce the Vijñāna in the womb like a reflected image. Thus Vijñāna is the principle of new life. It is by this Vijñāna that name (nāma) and form (rūpa) become associated. "If the Vijñāna had not entered the womb, then, no nāmarūpa could have appeared" (Dīghanikāya, II. 63).

Vedanā is the feeling like pleasure or pain resulting out of merits or sins of previous lives. The feeling is produced by sense-contact (sparśa).

Saṃjñā is that where specific knowing or conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red, as ghaṭa or paṭa, takes place—'sacetanācetanāsvārūpavyavaharaṇam'.

Saṃskāra is so called because it synthesises. Saṃyutta-nikāya (III. 87) says that it is Saṃskāra that conglomerated Saṃjñā as Saṃjñā and Vijñāna as Vijñāna. It is thus a mental state synthesising impressions of merits and sins committed by mind and body (nāmarūpa).

Rūpa means the four elements and those which arise depending on them as the modification of them. In the Saṃyutta-nikāya, Buddha says—"O Bhikkus! it is called rūpa because it manifests (rūpyati); how does it manifest? It manifests as cold, as heat, as thirst and as hunger..." Thus rūpa is that which manifests itself to the senses and stands for matter and material qualities, the senses and the sense-data.

These five aggregates, which are ever-waxing and ever-waning, (Saṃsāre amī cayāpacayarūpāḥ), constitute Duḥkha, the first Noble Truth.

The author now introduces the second Noble Truth, Samudaya:

समुदेति यतो लोके रागादीनां गणोऽखिलः ।

आत्मात्मियस्वभावाख्यः समुदयः स संमतः ।

॥ ६ ॥

That from which arises the entirety of passion, hatred, etc., rooted in the sense of 'myself' and 'mine' in this world, is considered to be Samudaya or Source of Evil (6).

Samudayaḥ—yataḥ kiñcit samudeti saḥ samudayaḥ, that from which something arises. That from which the whole stock of passion, hatred, etc., arises is here called Samudaya or the source of sorrow (evil). What is that source? The answer to this question is to be sought in 'Pratitya-samutpāda' again, wherein we find that the root-cause of all sorrow is Avidyā or ignorance about the true nature of self. This self, according to canonical Buddhists, is nothing other than the complex of the body and mind (rūpa and nāma) or the totality of the five Skandhas. 'Self' is 'only a label for the aggregate of physical and psychical factors'. Even in this sense of being a complex the self is not permanent. It is undergoing change almost constantly and in Nirvāṇa it completely ceases to be. If a person says that he perceived this self, he is only deluding

himself, as he perceives one or more of the five Skandhas. It is the clinging to this false self that explains all the misery of life. All things are thus aggregates, let alone self. This is known as the 'Nairātmyavāda' (doctrine of no-self) of the Buddhists. Avidyā is the absence of this knowledge. In other words, avidyā is the craving or the desire for existence (trṣṇā), which has three forms as craving for the life of sense (Kāmatrṣṇā), craving for becoming (Bhavatrṣṇā) and craving for not becoming (Vibhavatrṣṇā). It is from this preoccupation with craving and its gratification that rāga, dveṣa, etc., are born. That is the source of sorrow.

Rāga, dveṣa, etc., are thus born from the craving rooted in the wrong conception of self (Avidyā). That is, rāga and dveṣa depend on the wrong conceptions like 'this is myself and this is mine' (ayamātmā ayamātmīyaḥ), 'this is another and this is another's (ayam pa. aḥ ayam parakīyaḥ). That from which rāga and dveṣa are born is called 'Samudaya'—"ātmātmīyarūpeṇa rāgarūpaḥ parakīyapariṇāmena dveṣarūpaḥ yataḥ samudeti sa samudayaḥ". That is why 'rāgādinam akhilaḥ gaṇaḥ' is 'ātmātmīyasvabhāvākhyāḥ.'

The third and the fourth Noble Truths are explained in the next stanza:

क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा इत्येवं वासना तु या ।

स मार्ग इति विज्ञेयो निरोधो मोक्ष उच्यते ।

॥ ७ ॥

The impression that all conceptions are momentary is to be known as the means of overcoming evil (Mārga); removal of evil is called emancipation. (7)

Saṃskāras are the impressions or synthetic mental states or conceptions. They mean the first impressions based on the mistaken series of conceptions like 'this is the same', 'this is the same' with regard to the objects like ghaṭa, paṭa, stambha, ambhoruḥa, etc., in their second and subsequent moments—'ghaṭapaṭastambhāmbhoruhādīnām

dvitīyādikṣaṇeṣu sa evāyaṃ sa evāyamiti ye jñānasantānāḥ te'. All these saṃskāras are momentary.

The momentariness of all existence is a cardinal doctrine of the Bauddha-darśana. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything or as that which possesses causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). An object is said to be existent, because it is producing certain effects at the present moment. It cannot be said that it is not momentary, because the effects produced at the present moment cannot be held as identical with those produced by it in the past or those to be produced by it in the future. In the same way we cannot say that it was producing no effect in the past and that it will produce no effect in the future, because, if it had no capacity to produce effects (arthakriyāśakti) in the past and if it ceases to have the same in future, it should not have the capacity to produce the effect at the present moment. Assuming that the effects produced at the present moment are not identical with those in the past and future, one can realise that the thing is not the same now at the present moment as it was in the past and as it will be in the future. Even the contradiction that it produces effects at one moment and does not produce effects at another moment, will also prove that the things are different at different moments (Śaktāśakta-svabhāvatayā pratikṣaṇaṃ bhedaḥ). Hence, 'arthakriyāśakti', which is but the other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness (arthakriyāśaktiḥ kṣaṇikatvavyāptā). The same can be reduced to this argument:

Whatever exists is momentary by virtue of its existence, for example, the jug.

All things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existent.

Therefore they are momentary.

(Sarvaṃ sat kṣaṇikam, akṣaṇike krama-yaugapdyābhyā-martha-kriyāvirodhāt).

According to this argument, I may say that the fact that I remember to have been existing for the past thirty-four years does not mean that a permanent self has been existing for such a period. To take another example, when I say that this is that book, I see this book at this moment, but the identity of this book with that book cannot be perceived. 'This book' refers to the book before my eyes at the present moment. 'That book' refers to the book of memory. The feeling of identity between the two is thus due to the confusion between an object of memory and the object perceived at the present moment. 'Just as the flame of a candle (dīpakalikā) is changing every moment and yet appears as if it were one and the same, so all our bodies, our ideas, our emotions, all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, new ones are being generated every succeeding moment'. Though the objects are similar, they are not identical. Hence reality, whether material or spiritual, described in terms of time, is a flux or flow (Santāna) changing in such a rapid succession as to create a semblance of identity. This wrong notion of identity is 'Saṃskāra'. The notion that all saṃskāras are momentary, i.e., the correct impression of reality as a flux, is the means to overcome Duḥkha (Evil)—Mārga. In order to get this notion effectively secured, a long course of moral training is imperative. This moral course is constituted by the Noble Eightfold Discipline (Āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga) consisting of (i) Samyak drṣṭi—Right vision, (ii) Samyak saṅkalpa—Right resolve, (iii) Samyak vāk—Right speech, (iv) Samyak jīva—Right livelihood, (v) Samyak vyāyāma—Right effort, (vi) Samyak smṛti—Right mindfulness, (vii) Samyak cāritra—Right conduct and (viii) Samyak samādhi—Right concentration.

As regards the fourth Noble Truth, Nirodha, the author says that it is emancipation—'Nirodho mokṣa ucyate'. The

word 'nirodha' means restraint, removal and finally cessation, the stopping of all 'citta'-processes, which is Nirvāṇa. The firm conviction in 'Sarvaśaṇikatva' and 'Sarva-nairātmya' gives rise to total 'Vairāgya' (renunciation). When 'Vairāgya' is taken recourse to, the process of removal starts. In other words, the impression of the momentariness of all things and the unsubstantial nature of all things, is 'Nirodha'. If the chain of twelve causes (Pratītya-samutpāda) in its process of 'pravṛtti' brings in sorrow, the same in its process of 'nivṛtti' brings cessation of sorrow, which is emancipation or Nirvāṇa.

After dealing with the Four Noble Truths, the author refers to the twelve 'Āyatana's' (fields of contact), which are connected with them:—

पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि शब्दाद्या विषयाः पञ्च मानसम् ।

धर्मायतनमेतानि द्वादशायतनानि च

॥ ८ ॥

The five senses, the five objects of sense such as sound, etc., the mind and mental image—these are the twelve fields of contact. (8)

Thus 'Āyatana's' are the six senses and their six objects. The word 'Āyatana' literally means 'field of operation'. We learn from Pratītya-samutpāda that these fields of contact are responsible for desire (trṣṇā). When the operation in the fields is stopped, craving ceases and when craving subsides, there is finally the cessation of sorrow, which is 'Nirodha' or Nirvāṇa.

Manibhadra adds that by virtue of 'ca' we are also to understand the twelve causes that form the 'Pratītya-samutpāda' as the twelve 'Āyatana's'—"..... na kevala-metāni dvādaśāyatanāni jātijarāmarābhavopādānatṣṇā-vedanāsparsānāmarūpavijñānasamskāraṇāvyārūpāni dvādaśāyatanāni, caḥ samuccaye".

Now the author proceeds to deal with the Pramāṇas (means of right knowledge) acceptable to the Bauddhas:—

प्रमाणे द्वे च विज्ञेये तथा सौगतदर्शने ।

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च सम्यग्ज्ञानं द्विधा यतः

॥ ९ ॥

Now in the Bauddha system, there are only two valid means of knowledge, Perception and Inference, because right knowledge is two-fold. (9)

'Samyagjñāna'—here Manibhadra remarks that the use of 'Samyak' is for rejecting 'false knowledge'—'samyag-grahaṇam mithyājñānanirākaraṇārtham'. 'Samyagjñāna' is described by Dharmottara, a commentator of Dharmakīrti's 'Nyāyabindu' as an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man desires to achieve—'Samyagjñānanapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ'. The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the fulfilment of the practical need—"Arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ". This process of knowledge is two-fold, as Perception and Inference, because right knowledge is two fold, as perceptual and inferential. The Buddhists recognise only two Pramāṇas.

The author explains the two Pramāṇas as follows:

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढमभ्रान्तं तत्र बुध्यताम् ।

त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतो लिङ्गिज्ञानं त्वनुमानसंज्ञितम्

॥ १० ॥

Know that perception is that direct cognition which is devoid of all thought-determination and which is non-illusory. The knowledge of the probandum, on the other hand, from the three-fold probans, is called Inference. (10)

Pratyakṣa is 'kalpanāpoḍham' and 'abhrāntam'. 'Kalpanāpoḍham'—Śabdasamsargavati pratītiḥ kalpanā, tayā apoḍham rahitam—i.e., Kalpanā is an apprehension associated with names and relations. Pratyakṣa is free from such 'kalpanā'. That is to say that perception is only

'nirvikalpaka' or indeterminate. It is only indeterminate knowledge consisting in the copy of the object directly cognised shorn of all relations. As regards external reality, we know that the Buddhists conceive it as momentary. An object is a series of members. Each member of the series that constitute an object is called a 'Svalakṣaṇa' literally 'like itself', which represents a bare particular. The only object of perception is that unique thing-in-itself. Common features such as qualities, actions, which are called 'sāmānyalakṣaṇas' are really the figments of mind. Perceptual knowledge is free from such figments (kalpanā). Perception is also 'abhrāntam', non-illusory, because the sense-illusions like the appearance of the double moon do not come under it. 'Svalakṣaṇam hi pratyakṣam nirvikalpamabhrāntaṇca tat', 'Pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham nāmajātyādyasamputam'—Pramāṇa-Samuccaya, I. 3. 'Pratyakṣam kalpanāpodhamabhrāntam'—Nyāyabindu, I. 3.

Now regarding Inference, it is said that it is 'trirūpālīngato līngijñānam', the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) from the probans (hetu) which is of three forms. The three forms of 'hetu' are:

रूपाणि पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे विद्यमानता ।

विपक्षे नास्तिता हेतोरेवं त्रीणि विभाव्यन्ताम् ॥ ११ ॥

To be the characteristic of the object of inference, to be existent in those cases where the probandum exists, and to be absent in those cases where the probandum does not exist—these are the three forms of the probans. (11)

Pakṣa is 'sādhya-dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī'—a thing which possesses the attribute of the probandum. For instance, in 'Parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt', (The mountain is fiery because it has smoke), 'parvata' is 'pakṣa' as it possesses smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire—'atra parvato pakṣaḥ, tatra dharmo dhūmavattvaṃ vahnimattvena

vyāptam'. The fire is the probandum, the smoke is its attribute by virtue of invariable concomitance with it. To be an attribute of the object of inference (Pakṣadharmatva) is the first form of the probans.

'Sapakṣa' (similar instance) is that case where the existence of the probandum is never doubted—'Niścitasādhya-vān sapakṣaḥ'. For example, in 'Yo yo dhūmavān sa sa vahnimān yathā mahānasapradeśaḥ', mahānasapradeśa (kitchen) is the Sapakṣa, because the presence of fire, the probandum, is never doubted in it. The smoke, which is the probans, also exists in it. The 'Vyāpti' (invariable concomitance), viz., wherever there is smoke there is fire, is arrived at after examining the similar instances (Sapakṣaḥ). To be present in all cases where the probandum is never doubted is the second form of the probans called 'Sapakṣe vidyamānatā'.

'Vipakṣa' (contrary instance) is that case where the probandum does not exist—'Niścita-sādhya-bhāvavān vipakṣaḥ'. For instance, in 'Yatra vahnirnāsti tatra dhūmo'pi nāsti yathā jalāśaye', the jalāśaya (ocean) is a contrary instance because the probandum, fire, does not exist in it. This confirms the Vyāpti already arrived at. To be absent in those cases where the probandum does not exist is the third form of the probans, called 'Vipakṣe nāstitā'.

Thus Anumāna is accepted by the Bauddhas as the second means of right knowledge. Like all Hindu logicians, they too keep a general statement relating two things or events formulated on a principle (Vyāpti) as the basis of Inference. But while the Hindu logicians admit several kinds of Vyāpti (invariable concomitance), the Buddhists recognise only two kinds of Vyāpti, viz., (i) Vyāpti between cause and effect (Tadutpatti) and (ii) Vyāpti between genus (Jāti) and species (Vyakti)—(Tādātmya). The first kind of Vyāpti is the natural inseparable relation of the effect with the cause.

For instance, in 'Yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatra vahniḥ', there is the natural inseparable relation (Svabhāva-pratibandha) of 'dhūma', the effect, with 'Vahni', the cause. The second kind of Vyāpti is the natural connection of the species with the genus. For instance in 'Yātra yatra śiṃśupatvaṃ tatra tatra pādapatvaṃ' there is the 'svabhāva-pratibandha' of 'śiṃśupatva' the species, with 'pādapatva' (tree-ness), the genus.

Vyāpti, according to Buddhists, is, as common with Hindu logicians, the unfailing connection of the 'hetu' (probans) with the 'sādhya' (probandum). They too prescribe certain tests to establish the truth of the Vyāpti. Sapakṣe vidyamānatā, Vipakṣe nāstitā and Pakṣadharmatva, are the three conditions for testing the Vyāpti. Haribhadra-sūri calls these as the three forms of the 'hetu' or 'liṅga'.

2. NYĀYA-DARŚANA

The beginnings of Nyāya is not very clear. We are to depend upon certain wide surmises in this regard. The origin of Nyāya is to be probably traced to 'the disputations among scholars in ascertaining the right meaning of the Vedic texts'. The term 'Nyāya' in its general sense stands for 'argument or conclusion'. In the Upaniṣads, too, such disputation was perhaps called 'Vākovākya'. Mr. Bodas points out that Āpastamba (3rd century B.C.) used the word 'Nyāya' in the sense of 'Mīmāṃsā' (discussion). In Kauṭilya's time (300 B.C.) the familiar name of this 'Vidyā' was 'Ānvikṣakī'.

Gautama is considered to be the founder of the Nyāya-darśana. In his 'Nyāyasūtra' (4th century B.C.—Goldstücker), we find the sure attempt at the systematisation of 'Nyāya' into a system. The 'Nyāyasūtra' is divided into five chapters each of which is consisting of two sections. The work begins with the enumeration of sixteen categories, Pramāṇa, Prameya, etc. The whole of the work is devoted to the explanation of these categories. It is said at the outset that the highest good (nīśreyas) is attained by a thorough knowledge of the sixteen categories and that salvation (Apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of mithyājñāna (false knowledge), doṣa (defects), pravṛtti (attachment), janma (birth) and ultimately duḥkha (sorrow). Four Pramāṇas are recognised: Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda.

The bulk of the Nyāya literature after the 'Nyāyasūtra' consists of commentaries on the 'Nyāyasūtra' and commentaries on commentaries on the same. The earliest commentary on the 'Nyāyasūtra' was that of Vātsyāyana—(4th century A.D.). Udyotakara (635 A.D.) wrote a 'vārtikā'

on Vātsyāyana's commentary in order to defend Vātsyāyana's views against the unfavourable criticisms by the Buddhist logician Dinnāga in his 'Pramāṇa-samuccaya'. Vācaspatimiśra (840 A.D.) wrote a commentary on the 'Nyāyavārtikā' of Udyotakara called 'Nyāyavārtikā-tātparyāṭikā'. Then Udayana wrote 'Tātparyāṭikāpariśuddhi' on Vācaspati's commentary. He also contributed two independent works—Kusumāñjali and Ātmatattvaviveka. Jayanta's 'Nyāyamañjarī' is another outstanding commentary on the 'Nyāyasūtra'. This concluded the old or the Prācīna-phase of the history of Nyāya.

The new school of Nyāya called the Navinanyāya commenced about 12th century A.D. with the epoch-making work called Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya of Mithilā. A number of commentaries appeared on the Anumāna portion of the 'Tattvacintāmaṇi'. The most well-known commentators were Raghunāthaśiromaṇi (Dīdhiti—1500 A.D.), Mathurā Bhaṭṭācārya (1580 A.D.) and Gadādharaḥṭṭācārya (1590 A.D.), all of the Bengal school of Nyāya. The contribution of the new school was not in the direction of metaphysics, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept.

Haribhadrāsūri, in his treatment of the Nyāyadarśana depends, as will be clear in the subsequent discussion, on the 'Nyāyasūtra' and the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.

He introduces the treatment thus:

बौद्धराष्ट्रान्तवाच्यस्य संक्षेपोऽयं निवेदितः ।

नैयायिकमतस्येतः कथ्यमानो निशम्यताम्

॥ १२ ॥

The subject pertaining to the Bauddha-siddhānta is thus dealt with. Please listen to this account of the Nyāyadarśana which is subsequently explained. (12)

Now the author refers to the deity of the Nyāyadarśana :

अक्षपादमते देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः ।

विभुनित्यैकसर्वज्ञो नित्यबुद्धिसमाश्रयः

॥ १३ ॥

In Akṣapāda's system, the deity is Śiva (Īśvara), who is the creator and annihilator, who is all-pervasive, eternal and one, who is omniscient and who is the abode of eternal intelligence. (13)

The Nyāya system establishes the existence of God who is the creator and destroyer of the universe. He is eternal and all-pervasive. He is one and without a second. He is the abode of eternal intelligence. One special feature of this system is that the existence of God is established through inference and not through revelation as is the case in the Vedānta. The prominence is given to reason even in this regard as in regard to other cases. The universe with its movable and immovable objects, which is cognised through perception, presupposes a sentient being as its creator, whose power is indescribable—'Pratyakṣopalakṣyamānācarācarasvarūpasya jagataḥ kaścīdanirvacanīyamāhātmyaḥ sraṣṭā jñeyāḥ'. The argument advanced is as follows :

All this universe presupposes a sentient being,
because it is an effect.

Whatever is an effect, it presupposes a sentient being
(as its maker), for instance, a pot.

(Sarvaṃ dharanīdharanīdharādikaṃ buddhimatpūrvakaṃ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat).

That creator is Īśvara. Mere creation would not do. Even the three worlds would not accommodate if creation alone were to go on forever. This urges the necessity of a destroyer, too. The destroyer is Īśvara himself. Again the all-pervasive nature (sarvavyāpakatva) of Īśvara is to be admitted. If he were restricted to any particular place, the pre-ordained

creation and stationing of objects in the limitless number of their respective places would be 'unthinkable'—'Tathā Vibhuḥ sarvavyāpakah, ekaniyatasthānavṛttitve hyaniyata-pradeśaniṣṭhitānām padārthānām pratiniyatayathāvannirmāṇānupapatteḥ'. Further he is 'Nityaikaḥ'—nityaścā-sāvekaśca. Since he is eternal, he is one without a second. He is only one who is not subjected to destruction and who is not produced. That which is neither created nor destroyed is eternal—'apraciyutānutpannasthiraikarūpaṃ nityam'. He is also omniscient because he knows everything about all things—'Sarvapaḍārthānām sarvaviśeṣajñātā'. As he is omniscient, he fashions the material of all objects (Karya vastu—atoms) according to the measure compatible with the causal apparatus suitable for them and endow them with the experience of pleasure or pain according to the merits or sins acquired by them. Again he is—'nityabuddhi-samāśrayaḥ', because if his intellect were to be non-eternal, he would depend upon someone else for carrying out his function and his 'Īśvaratva' would be at stake—'Mukhya-kartṛtvābhāvādaniśvaratvaprasaṅgiḥ'.

The Lord who is recognised here by the Naiyāyikas, is classed by them under 'Ātman' and described as 'Paramātmān' (the Highest Soul) to distinguish him from the 'Jivātman' (Individual Soul)—'Guṇaviśiṣṭamātmāntaramiśvaraḥ' (Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya, 4.1.21).

The author now proceeds to enumerate principles or categories (tattvas) of the Nyāyadarśana:

तत्त्वानि शोडशमुत्र प्रमाणादीनि तद्यथा ।
 प्रमाणं च प्रमेयं च संशयश्च प्रयोजनम् ॥ १४ ॥
 दृष्टान्तोऽप्यथ सिद्धान्तोऽवयवस्तर्कनिर्णयो ।
 वादो जल्पो वितण्डा च हेत्वाभासाश्छलानि च ॥ १५ ॥
 जातयो निग्रहस्थानान्येषामेवं प्ररूपणा ।
 अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः स्यात्प्रमाणं तच्चतुर्विधम् ॥ १६ ॥

The principles (categories) here are sixteen, means of cognition, etc. They are: (1) Means of cognition, (2) Objects of cognition, (3) Doubt, (4) Purpose, (5) Illustrative instance, (6) Conclusion, (7) Premises, (8) Argumentation, (9) Ascertainment, (10) Debates, (11) Disputations, (12) Destructive criticism, (13) Fallacy, (14) Quibble, (15) Refutation, and (16) Points of opponent's defeat. Their nature is told thus: The means of apprehending objects is said to be Pramāṇa (1). It is fourfold. (14-16)

The list of the sixteen 'tattvas' is the same in respect of names and order as that we find in Gautama's Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 1. Gautama adds that by the knowledge of these principles one attains the highest good—'Tattvajñānānniśreyasiddhiḥ'.

After enumerating the tattvas, the author gives definition of the first tattva, Pramāṇa, (in the second line of stanza 16). Pramāṇa is defined as 'Arthopalabdhīhetuḥ'—arthasya padārthasya upalabdhīḥ jñānaṃ, tasya hetuḥ. The Nyāya system recognises four Pramāṇas.

The author now mentions four Pramāṇas and defines two of them:

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं चोपमानं शाब्दिकं तथा ।
 तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नमव्यभिचारिकम् ॥ १७ ॥
 व्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं व्यपदेशविर्जितम् ।
 प्रत्यक्षमितरन्मानं तत्पूर्वं त्रिविधं भवेत् ॥ १८ ॥

(Pramāṇa is fourfold) as Perception, Inference, Analogy and Verbal testimony. There (among the four), Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses with their objects, which is infallible, which is of practical utility and which is not associated with any sound cognition (name). Inference is that which follows perceptual knowledge. It is of three kinds. (17-18)

The definition of Pratyakṣa given here is verbatim the same as Gautama's—"Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāryavasāyātmakam Pratyakṣam" (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 4). That knowledge which results from the perceptual process of contact of the senses with the objects constitutes perception. Firstly, it should be 'avyabhicārikam'—i.e., free from error. For instance, the eyes of a person standing at a distance, fall on a mirage created by extreme heat. By the sense-contact with it, the knowledge that it is water is born. This is obviously an error, an illusion. In order to exclude such errors from the scope of perception, the viśeṣaṇa 'avyabhicārikam' is given; avyabhicārikam—yadatasmin taditi tadavyabhicāri, yattu tasmin taditi tadavyabhicāri pratyakṣamiti—(Nyāyabhāṣya: Vātsyāyana, I. i. 4). That is, to think of something as there when it is not there is 'vyabhicāri', and to think of something as existing there when it really exists is 'avyabhicāri'. Secondly, perception should be 'avasāyātmaka' i.e., practically useful. For instance a person standing at a distance, sees a thing and begins to ponder whether it is smoke or dust, without coming to any conclusion. The knowledge that is inconclusive (anavadhāraṇātmaka), is of no use. To exclude such instances from the sphere of perception, the viśeṣaṇa, 'avasāyātmaka' is given. Thirdly, it should be 'avyapadeśyam' i.e., unassociated with simultaneous sound-cognition or name. For instance, when I see a cow, some person says that it is a cow. This knowledge of the name as associated with the object cannot be regarded as perception, but as only verbal testimony (Śabdapramāṇa).

Anumāna or inference, on the other hand, is called 'ītaranmāna', that knowledge which arises after another knowledge. 'Tatpūrvam' means 'Pratyakṣapūrvam'; inference (anu-māna) follows perception, through which 'parāmarśa' (the knowledge of the probans being the feature

of the given instance as qualified by invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum—Vyāpti-viśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānam), is born.

Anumāna is of three kinds, as given below:

पूर्ववच्छेषवच्चैव दृष्टं सामान्यतस्तथा ।	
तत्राद्यं कारणात्कार्यमनुमानमिह गीयते	॥ १९ ॥
रोलम्बगबलव्यालतमालमलिनत्वेषः ।	
वृष्टि व्यभिचरन्तीह नवंप्रायाः पयोमुचः	॥ २० ॥
कार्यात्कारणानुमानं यच्च तच्छेषवन्मतम् ।	
तथाविधनदीपुरान्मेघो वृष्टो यथोपरि	॥ २१ ॥
यच्च सामान्यतो दृष्टं तदेवं गतिपूर्विका ।	
पुंसि देशान्तरप्राप्तिर्यथा सूर्योऽपि सा तथा	॥ २२ ॥

(Anumāna is of three kinds) as Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Sāmānyato dṛṣṭam. The first one (Pūrvavat) consists in the inference of the effect from the cause. (19)

(For instance): The clouds are as dark as bees, horns of a bison, elephants and tamāla trees. Such clouds shall never go without rain. (20)

The inference of the cause from the effect is called 'Śeṣavat'. For instance, such an inundation of the river shows that the cloud has shed the rain on the hill. (21)

What is called 'Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa' is like this: Just as reaching of another place is preceded by movement in the case of a man, so is it in the case of the sun. (22)

(i) Pūrvavat—It is the inference of the effect from the cause. Pūrvamasyāsti iti—Pūrvavat. What is inferred here is the effect; the effect is preceded by a cause (Pūrvā). Hence this inference is called Pūrvavat. In the given example, 'Rolāmbagabala, etc.', the certainty of rain (effect) is inferred from the extremely dark cloud (cause). Vātsyāyana (Nyāya-

bhāṣya): “Pūrvavāditi. Tatra kāraṇena kārymanumīyate. Yathā meghonnatyā ‘bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭiriti’.”

(ii) Śeṣavat—It is the inference of the cause from the effect. The effect follows the cause; it is that which remains after the cause (Śeṣa). In the given example, ‘Tathāvidhanadīpūra, etc.’, the floods in the river constitute the effect from which the cause that the rain has come is inferred. Vide Vātsyāyana (Nyāyabhāṣya): “Śeṣavat. Tadyatra kāryeṇa kāraṇamanumīyate. Nadyāḥ Pūrṇatvaṃ śighratvaṃ ca dṛṣṭvā srotaso’numīyate ‘bhūtā vṛṣṭiriti’”.

(iii) Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa—This is the inference of something which cannot be perceived on the basis of what is generally found. In the given example, ‘Gatipūrvikā, etc.’, a person’s reaching another place is preceded by movement. In the same way the sun’s reaching one quarter from the other must be preceded by movement. But the movement of the sun is not perceived. Yet, it is inferred on the basis of what is generally found, viz., the movement having been an antecedent to the reaching of another place by any person. Vātsyāyana (Nyāyabhāṣya): “Sāmānyato dṛṣṭam. Vrajyāpūrvakamanyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanamiti. Tathā cādityasya. Tasmāstasyapratyakṣāpyādityasya vrayeti”.

Thus of the three kinds of inference, the first two are based on causation, while the third one is based on co-existence or analogy.

Now the author defines and illustrates Analogy, the third means of knowledge:

प्रसिद्धवस्तुसाधर्म्यादप्रसिद्धस्य साधनम् ।

उपमानं समाख्यातं यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा

॥ २३ ॥

The cognition of an unknown object on the strength of its similarity with a known object is analogy, as ‘Like the cow is this gavaya’. (23)

This definition is faithful to Gautama’s aphorism—“Prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanamupamānam”. (Nyāya sūtra, I. i. 6). Vātsyāyana explains it as ‘Prajñātena sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanamupamānamiti’. In the light of this explanation, we may analyse the compound ‘Prasiddhavastusādharmyāt’ thus: ‘Prasiddhena (Prajñātena) vastunā sādharmyam (sāmānyam), tasmāt’, i.e., from (or on the basis of) similarity with a known object. ‘Prasiddhavastusādharmyāt aprasiddhasya sādhyasya (prajñāpanīyasya) sādhanam (prajñāpanam) upamānam’—i.e., Analogy consists in the cognition of an unknown object (which is to be known) on the basis of its similarity with a known object. For example, in ‘Yathā gauḥ gavayaḥ tathā’, there is the cognition of ‘gavaya’, which is an unknown animal to a city dweller on the basis of its similarity with ‘gauḥ’ which is a known animal.

The author now defines ‘Śabda-pramāṇa’ in the next stanza (first line) and refers to the second tattva, Prameya in the second line:

शाब्दमाप्तोपदेशस्तु मानमेवं चतुर्विधम् ।

प्रमेयं चात्मदेहार्थबुद्धीन्द्रियसुखादि च

॥ २४ ॥

The statement of a trustworthy person is verbal testimony. Means of valid knowledge is thus fourfold. The objects of knowledge are soul, body, sense-objects, intellect, senses, joy and the rest. (24)

Gautama’s sūtra regarding ‘Śabda-pramāṇa’ says “Āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ”. ‘Āpta’ or trustworthy person is defined as ‘yathārthavaktā’, one whose utterances are absolutely truthful. The Āptas are of two types, viz., Sarvajñāḥ and Asarvajñāḥ, the omniscient and the non-omniscient. The authority of the omniscient is proved by the very means employed to establish their omniscience. ‘Sarvajñānām prāmāṇyam tadastitvabodhakapramāṇenaiva

nirṇītam'. The feelings of passion, hatred, etc., which are the causes of unreliability, are not found in the omniscient. As regards the non-omniscient, the authority depends upon a triad of causes, viz., (1) Upadeśaviśayasya yathārthajñānam—the right comprehension of what is stated, (2) Yathārthajñāna-cikhyāpayiṣā—the desire to communicate what is rightly known, and (3) Vacanādikaraṇapāṭavam—the skill in expression, etc. Here the omniscient trustworthy person is Īśvara alone, and the non-omniscient are others in the world.

Prameyam—Ātmā, etc. This list of Prameyārthas is to be supplemented by the other six, namely, Manaḥ (mind), Doṣa, (defect), Pretiyabhāva (the state of birth and death), Phala (fruit), Duḥkha (pain) and Apavarga (liberation)—“Ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanaḥpravṛttidoṣapretiyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargāstu prameyam” (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 9) Haribhadrāsūri uses the word ‘sukha’ in the place of ‘pravṛtti’ of the Nyāyasūtra.

(1) Ātmā—is described as one who sees all, enjoys all, knows all and experiences all—‘Sarvasya draṣṭā sarvasya bhoktā sarvajñaḥ sarvānubhavī’ (Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya).

(2) Dehā (śarīra) has been described as the abode of the soul’s experience—‘Tasya (ātmanah) bhogāyatanaṁ śarīram’. It is the substratum of activity, senses and sense-objects—‘Ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīram’ (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 11).

(3) Indriyāṇi—They are the instruments of experience—‘Bhogasādhanaṇi indriyāṇi’.

(4) Ārthāḥ are those that are to be enjoyed—‘Bhoktavyā indriyārthāḥ’. They are five: gandha (odour), rasa (taste), rūpa (colour), sparśa (touch) and śabda (sound). These are the distinct qualities of the elements Pṛthivī (earth), Āpaḥ (water), Tejas (fire), Vāyu (air) and Ākāśa (ether)

respectively—“Gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ tadārthāḥ” (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 14).

(5) Buddhi is, according to Vātsyāyana, bhoga or experience itself; it is the fund of experience.

(6) Manas is an instrument of all cognition, external and internal—‘Sarvaviśayamantaḥkaraṇaṁ manaḥ’ (Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya). It is the internal instrument of cognition of pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, volition, etc., as later explained by Annambhaṭṭa—‘Sukhādyupalabdisādhanaṁindriyaṁ manaḥ’ (Tarkasaṅgraha).

(7) Pravṛtti is described as the endeavour causing the body, senses, sense-objects and intellect to experience happiness—‘Śarīrendriyārthabuddhisukhavedanānāṁ nirvṛtikāraṇaṁ’ (Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya). Haribhadrāsūri names it as ‘Sukha’.

(8) Doṣāḥ are those that lead men to virtue or vice—‘Pravartanalakṣaṇā doṣāḥ’ (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 18).

(9) Pretiyabhāva is rebirth—‘Punarutpattiḥ pretiyabhāvaḥ’ (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 19).

(10) Phalam is the experience of joy or sorrow along with the means like body, etc.—“Sasādhanaṁsukhaduḥkhopabhogaḥ phalam” (Vātsyāyana).

(11) Duḥkha is that which causes suffering—‘Bādhanaḥlakṣaṇaṁ duḥkham’ (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 21).

(12) Apavarga is the break of the series of birth and death and the cessation of all pain—‘Janmamaraṇaprabandhocchedaḥ sarvaduḥkhoprahāṇamapavargaḥ’ (Vātsyāyana).

After dealing with the ‘Prameyārthas’, the author takes up Saṁśaya and Prayojana:

किमेतदिति सन्दिग्धः प्रत्ययः संशयो मतः।

प्रवर्तते यदर्थित्वात्तत्तु साध्यं प्रयोजनम्

॥ २५ ॥

Doubt is the conflicting notion in the form of 'whether it is this or that'. Purpose is that for attaining which one sets oneself to work. (25)

Samśayatattva—is the conflicting notion regarding the identity of an object at a distance. It is in the form of 'Sthānurvā puruṣo vā' (whether it is a post or a man).

Prayojana-tattva is 'Yadarthitvāt sādhyam (prati) pravartate tatprayojanam'—yadarthitvāt (yam artham uddiśya) kaścit sādhyam prati (kāryam prati) pravartate (udyamate), tat prayojanam. Gautama says "Yamarthamadhikṛtya pravartate tatprayojanam". (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 24). Thus purpose is that for attaining which or giving up of which one sets oneself to work. All human endeavour (Pravṛtti) is directed towards the attainment of happiness or the removal of sorrow (sukhaprāpti or duḥkhaparihāra). They are the main purposes. The rest of the purposes are subsidiary.

Now the author refers to the next two tattvas, namely, Drṣṭānta and Siddhānta:

दृष्टान्तस्तु भवेदेष विवादविषयो न यः ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु चतुर्भेदः सर्वतन्त्रादिभेदतः

॥ २६ ॥

Illustrative example (Drṣṭānta) is that regarding which there is no controversy. Conclusion is fourfold, as the conclusion common to all systems, etc. (26)

Drṣṭānta is that regarding which there is no difference of opinion. That is, in other words, Drṣṭānta is that on which both the common man and the expert hold the same opinion—"Laukikaparīkṣakāṇām yasminnarthe buddhisāmyam sa drṣṭāntaḥ" (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 25). The 'laukikas' are those who are not above the capacity of an average man (laukikasāmānyamanatītāḥ). They have no superior intelligence, either inherently or through hard study (naisargikam vainayikam, buddhyatisāyamapṛāptāḥ)—Vātsyāyana: Nyāya-

bhāṣya). The 'parīkṣaka', on the other hand, is one who is capable of ascertaining something by either arguments or proofs (tarkeṇa pramāṇairartham parīkṣitumarhatīti—Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya). That regarding which there is no difference of opinion between an ordinary man and an expert is called as Drṣṭānta or Illustrative example. The Drṣṭānta serves the following purposes:—(i) The opinions of the opponents are refuted by showing them as contradictory to the well-known example (Drṣṭānta-virodhabena pratipakṣāḥ pratiṣeddhavyāḥ). (2) The stand of one's school is established by showing its conformity with the example (Drṣṭāntasamādhinā svapakṣāḥ sthāpaniyāḥ). (3) The example is utilised as one of the five premises of the inferential process.

Siddhānta—Haribhadrāsūri refers to four kinds of doctrines (conclusions). He does not give any definition of Siddhānta. The term 'Siddhānta' is made up of two words ('siddha' and 'anta'). 'Siddha', as Vātsyāyana explains, denotes all those things with regard to which people have a definite idea that they are so and so. (Idamitthambhūtaṁ cetyabhyānujñāyamānamarthajātaṁ siddham—Nyāyabhāṣya). 'Anta' denotes the conviction regarding the particular character of those things (Siddhasya samsthiṭiḥ siddhāntaḥ). Gautama says—"Tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasamsthiṭiḥ siddhāntaḥ"—(Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 26)—i.e., the doctrine is the conviction based on the system of philosophy, on implication and on hypothesis (tantra, adhikaraṇa and abhyupagama). Vātsyāyana says that the sūtra defining Siddhānta has a reference to the four kinds of Siddhānta. 'Tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagama' is a Dvandva compound. Vātsyāyana connects each of these, 'tantra', 'adhikaraṇa' and 'abhyupagama', with the word 'samsthiṭi'. Here the first one is 'tantra-samsthiṭi'. This is the conviction based on the direct assertions of either all systems of philosophy

(Sarvatantra) or an individual system of philosophy (Pratitantra). This yields two kinds of Siddhānta as (1) Sarvatantra-siddhānta and (2) Pratitantra-siddhānta. Next the conviction based on implication (Adhikaraṇa) forms the third kind of Siddhānta called 'Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta'. The fourth one is the conviction based on hypothesis (Abhyupagama) and it is called 'Abhyupagama-siddhānta'. Thus we have four kinds of Siddhānta:

(1) Sarvatantra-siddhānta—Doctrine common to all systems: It is that which is not incompatible with any system of philosophy (Sarvatantrāviruddhaḥ arthaḥ). For instance, the doctrines that 'nose, etc. are the senses', 'odour, etc., are the sense-objects', 'earth, etc. are the elements', 'the objects are cognised through valid means' (respectively, 'ghrāṇādīni indriyāṇi', 'gandhādayaḥ indriyārthāḥ', 'pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni', 'pramāṇairarthasya grahaṇam'), etc., are common to all systems of philosophy (tantrāṇi).

(2) Pratitantra-siddhānta—Doctrine peculiar to one system: It is the doctrine which is accepted by one system and not accepted by any other system (Samānatantrasiddhaḥ paratantrāsiddhaḥ arthaḥ). For example, the doctrines like 'nāsaṭaḥ atmalābhaḥ' (an absolute non-entity can never come into existence), 'na sataḥ ātmahānam' (an entity can never absolutely lose its existence), etc., are peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas and the doctrines like 'puruṣakarmādinimitto bhūtasargaḥ' (the entire elemental creation is due to the influence of the past deeds of men), 'karmahetavo doṣāḥ pravṛttiśca' (the defects of men and also their activity are the cause of 'Karman'), etc., are peculiar to the Yoga system.

(3) Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta—Doctrine resting on implication: This is the doctrine on the acceptance of which depends the acceptance of another fact (Yatsiddhau anyat-

prakaraṇasiddhiḥ). When a certain fact is established, other facts become implied. Without these latter facts, the former fact itself cannot be established. For instance, when the fact that the cogniser is distinct from the body and the sense-organs is established by the fact of one and the same object being apprehended by the organs of vision and touch (dehendriyavyatirikto jñātā, darśana-sparśanābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāt), the following facts are implied:—(i) that there are more sense-organs than one (indriyanānātvam); (ii) that the sense-organs operate upon particular kinds of object (niyataviśayaṇi indriyāṇi); (iii) that they are the instruments of bringing cognitions to the cogniser (jñāturjñānasādhanaṇi indriyāṇi); etc. Without these latter facts, the former fact 'dehendriyavyatirikto jñātā', is not established. The former fact is called implied doctrine (Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta).

(4) Abhyupagama-siddhānta—Doctrine based on hypothesis: This is a case of taking an uninvestigated fact for granted and proceeding to examine its particular details. For example, in 'Asti dravyaṃ Śabdaḥ, sa ca nityo'nityo vā', we take the fact that sound is a substance without investigation and then proceed to investigate whether it is eternal or non-eternal.

The author now proceeds to speak of the next two tattvas, Avayava and Tarka:

प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तोपनया निगमस्तथा ।

अवयवाः पञ्च तर्कः संशयोपरमो भवेत्

॥ २७ ॥

यथा काकादिसम्पातात् स्थाणुना भाव्यमत्र हि ।

The premises of inference are five, (i) Statement of the proposition, (ii) Statement of the probans, (iii) Statement of the illustrative example, (iv) Reaffirmation and (v) Final conclusion. Reasoning is the termination of doubt. (27) For instance, by the attack of the crows, etc., it is to be assumed that it is a post. (28—I line).

It may be noted here that in the Nyāya-system, Inference is generally regarded as of two kinds as Svārtha and

Parārtha, the former is for one's own sake and the latter is for the sake of convincing others through the employment of five premises (avayavas), viz., Pratijñā, Hetu, Drṣṭānta (Udāharaṇa), Upanaya and Nigama. These five 'avayavas' are here given:

(i) Pratijñā—Statement of the proposition: It consists in the stating of what is to be proved (Sādhyanirdeśaḥ), as 'Anityaḥ śabdaḥ' (sound is non-eternal).

(ii) Hetu—Statement of the probans: It is that which demonstrates the probandum (Sādhya) through its similarity to the illustrative example and also through dissimilarity (Udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam tathā vaidharmyāt). For example, (a) by similarity (Anvaya): Anityaḥ śabdaḥ, utpattidharmakatvat, utpattidharmakam anityam drṣṭam (ghaṭapaṭādivat); (b) by dissimilarity (Vyatireka): Anityaḥ śabdaḥ, utpattidharmakatvāt, anutpattidharmakam nityam yathā ātmādi.

(iii) Drṣṭānta—Statement of illustrative example: It is that which, through similarity to what is to be proved (sādhya), is possessed of a property of the probandum (Sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhāvi). For instance: Śabdaḥ anityaḥ, utpattidharmakatvāt, utpattidharmakam anityam ghaṭādivat'. Here 'Ghaṭādivat' is the Drṣṭānta which is similar to the sādhya and possesses the property of the sādhya (Utpattidharmakatva). This is the first kind of Drṣṭānta called 'Anvayadrṣṭānta'. The second kind of Drṣṭānta which is called 'Vyatireki-drṣṭānta', is an instance which through dissimilarity to the probandum, does not possess the property of the probandum. For example: 'Anityaḥ śabdaḥ, utpattidharmakatvāt, yadanutpattidharmakam tan-nityam, yathā ātmādi'. Here 'Ātmādi' is the example which is dissimilar to the probandum and does not possess the property of the probandum (Utpattidharmakatva).

(iv) Upanaya—Reaffirmation: It is that statement which asserts, on the strength of the example, the subject as being so or as being not so (Udāharaṇāpekṣaḥ tathetyupa-saṃhāro no tatheti vā sādhyasya upanayaḥ—Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 38). In the similar instance, the probans is found to be concomitant with the probandum, while in the contrary instance, the absence of the probandum is concomitant with the absence of the probans. On the strength of the similar instance the subject (Pakṣa) is reasserted as possessing the probans. This is Upanaya. For example, in the similar instance 'Ghaṭādidravyam utpattidharmakam anityam', the probans, 'utpattidharmakatva', is found to be concomitant with the probandum, 'anityatva'. On the strength of this example, it is reasserted—'Śabdaḥ tathā (utpattidharmakatva)'. But on the strength of the contrary instance it is re-asserted that the subject does not possess the probans found in the example. For example, in 'Ātmādi-dravyam anutpattidharmakam nityam', the absence of the probans 'utpattidharmakatva', is concomitant with the absence of the probandum, 'anityatva'. On the strength of this it is reasserted that the subject does not possess 'anutpattidharmakatva'. The assertion in the form of 'na tathā śabdaḥ anutpattidharmakatva' is also Upanaya. Therefore, as 'Tātparyaṭīkā' (of Vācaspati) observes, the definition common to both kinds of Upanaya is 'Udāharaṇāpekṣaḥ upasaṃhāraḥ upanayaḥ'.

(v) Nigama—Final conclusion: It is the restatement of the proposition on the basis of the statement of the probans (Hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanam nigamanam—Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 39). It is in the form of 'Utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ'. It is to be noted that Nigamana differs from Pratijñā in so far as it is the statement of what is already proved (Siddhanirdeśa), while the latter is the statement of what is to be proved (Sādhyanirdeśa), although there is verbal similarity between them.

Tarka is the next tattva. It (reasoning) is the termination of doubt. Saṁśaya or Doubt is there where the real character of a thing is not ascertained, as in 'Sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā'. Tarka is the termination of doubt in the sense that it helps to ascertain one of the alternatives as the real character of a thing and the other alternative as not the real character of the thing by indicating proofs in either case. Thus, for instance, when there is doubt in the form of 'Sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā' with reference to an object seen at a distance, reasoning helps to ascertain one of the alternatives as true, either 'sthāṇu or puruṣa', by indicating proofs in either case. Supposing there are proofs to ascertain the real character of the thing as 'sthāṇu' (post), they themselves are adduced to show the absurdity of accepting the other alternative as 'puruṣa' (man). The proofs such as the attack by the crows, etc. (Kākādisampāta) and the absence of movement on the part of the object to frighten the crows away, show that the object is a post, but not a man. Therefore, Tarka is reasoning which indicates the presence of proofs for the purpose of ascertaining the real character of a thing when the real character of a thing is not ascertained. 'Avijñātataṭṭvārthe kāraṇopapattitastattvajñānārthamūhas-tarkaḥ' (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 40). Tarka is for the purpose of knowing the real character of a thing. It should not be urged that it is embodying knowledge itself, because true knowledge arises from Pramāṇas. Tarka is simply assenting to the assertion of one of the two suspected characters on the strength of proofs. It does not accurately determine that the thing must be so and so. "Anujānātyayamekataram dharmaṁ kāraṇopapattya na tvavadhārayati... evamevedamiti" (Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya). Since it serves the purpose of the pramāṇas, it is mentioned as a separate tattva along with them.

It may be noted here that both Tarka and Anumāna-pramāṇa start with a doubt. But the difference between

the two lies in the end achieved by them. Tarka does not accurately determine that the thing must be so and so (evamevedamiti nāvadhārayati). Anumāna as a means of right knowledge ends with the conclusion which accurately determines the thing as so and so. Starting with a doubt, say, about the presence of the fire (sādhya) in the hill (pakṣa), after seeing smoke (hetu) there, it ends with the conclusion that the hill has fire, thus giving the definite nature of the thing as it is. Tarka serves the purpose of Anumāna in strengthening the inferential conclusion by showing the absurdity of assuming its contrary. 'There can be no smoke in the hill if there were no fire in it' — this is the form of Tarka. This shows the absurdity of the contention in view of the fact that we see smoke in the hill at the moment. Vātsyāyana has a significant remark to make in his introductory Bhāṣya to the sūtra (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 40) defining Tarka, "Ata ūrdhvaṁ tarko lakṣaṇīya iti" — i.e., Avayavānantaram tarkasyaivoddeśaḥ pratipakṣanirākaraṇena cānumānasyopod-balakaścāyamato 'yameva kramaprāpta iti.

Now comes the turn of Nirṇaya in the author's treatment:

ऊर्ध्वं सन्देहतर्काभ्यां प्रत्ययो निर्णयो मतः

॥ २८ ॥

The accepted conclusion is the ascertainment after doubt and reasoning. (28—II line).

Doubt is in the form of 'Sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā'. Reasoning assents to and confirms the assertion that it is 'sthāṇu' on the strength of the proofs like 'Kākādisampāta', etc. After this deliberation, the real character of the thing is ascertained as—'Ayaṁ sthāṇuḥ (na tu puruṣaḥ)'. This is the Nirṇaya or accepted conclusion. The deliberation noted above consists in the consideration of Pakṣa (an argument in favour of a certain conclusion) and of Pratipakṣa (argument against a certain conclusion). Tarka forms a part of this deliberation by adducing the proofs to prove the Pakṣa and setting aside the Pratipakṣa. Nirṇaya is the

ascertainment of the real nature of a thing after duly deliberating over the Pakṣa and Pratipakṣa of the question—'Vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyāṃ arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ' (Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 41).

This definition of Nirṇaya applies only to the demonstrated truth with regard to a thing in doubt which is under investigation through reasoning. This does not apply to all kinds of demonstrated truth. For instance, in Pratyakṣa, the demonstrated truth (nirṇaya) consists simply in the 'ascertainment of the object'. The general definition of Nirṇaya is that it is right knowledge or cognition of the real state of a thing. It is of four kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony.

Now the author proceeds to explain the next tattva called 'Vāda':

आचार्यशिष्ययोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहात् ।

यः कथाभ्यासहेतुः स्यादसौ वाद उदाहृतः

॥ २९ ॥

Vāda or Debate is said to be that which is meant for rehearsing an academic dialogue between the teacher and the taught, by their taking the sides of a contention and a counter-contention (regarding a thing) respectively. (29)

Vāda consists in the putting forward by the teacher and the taught of a contention (Pakṣa) and a counter-contention (Pratipakṣa) regarding a thing. If one particular character of a thing is represented as 'Pakṣa', another contrary character of the same thing is represented as 'Pratipakṣa'. That is, the two contrary particular characters which are alleged to subsist in the same substratum are called 'Pakṣa' and 'Pratipakṣa'—"Ekādhikaraṇasthau viruddhau dharmau pakṣapratipakṣau". For instance, 'Astyātmā' and 'Nāstyātmā'. But, when two contrary characters are alleged to subsist in two different substances,

they are not called 'Pakṣa' and 'Pratipakṣa'. For example: 'Nitya ātmā' and 'Anitya buddhiḥ'. 'Parigraha' consists in supporting (Sādhana) or condemning (Upālambha) by means of proofs and reasonings (Pramāṇas and Tarka). This 'Vāda' helps to arrive at a definite conclusion. 'Parigraha' also consists in carrying on 'Pakṣa' and 'Pratipakṣa' in full accordance with the method of arguing through the five factors (Pañcāvayava)—'Pakṣaḥ pūrvapakṣaḥ pratijñādi-parigrahaḥ, pratipakṣa uttarapakṣaḥ pūrvapakṣavādiprayukta-pratijñādi-pratipañcakopanyāsapraudhiḥ' (Mañibhadra).

Next the author gives the definitions of the two tattvas, viz., Jalpa and Vitanḍā:

विजिगीषुकथा या तु छलजात्यादिदूषणम् ।

स जल्पः, सा वितण्डा तु प्रतिपक्षविवर्जिता

॥ ३० ॥

Jalpa or Disputation is the argumentation of a person only wishing for victory involving condemnation of (the opponents' stand) by quibble, futile rejoinder, etc. Vitanḍā or Destructive criticism is that which has no counter-contention (30).

'Chalajātyādidūṣaṇam,'—this is to be analysed as Instrumental-Tatpuruṣa (chalajātyādibhiḥ dūṣaṇam), but not as Genitive-Tatpuruṣa (chalajātyādīnām dūṣaṇam). By 'ādi' we are to understand 'Nigrahassthānāni' also. 'Chala' consists in apposing an assertion through the assumption of an alternative meaning. 'Jāti' is an apparent objection (futile rejoinder). 'Nigrahassthānāni' are the points of the opponent's defeat. (These three, Chala, Jāti and Nigrahassthānāni, will be subsequently explained under stanzas 31 and 32.) 'Jalpa' is meant for scoring a victory over the opponent by any means, even by Chala, etc. It may be noted here that 'Jalpa', like 'Vāda', puts forward 'Pakṣa' and 'Pratipakṣa'. But 'Jalpa' differs from 'Vāda' in so far as it condemns the opponent's view by means of Chala, etc., while 'Vāda' supports the 'Pakṣa' and con-

demns the 'Pratipakṣa' by means of proofs and reasonings (Pramāṇas and Tarka). Again 'Vāda' leads to some definite conclusion, while 'Jalpa' does not lead to any conclusion.

Now as regards 'Vitaṇḍā' the author says that it is 'pratipakṣavivarjitā'—pratipakṣeṇa vivarjitā, i.e., 'pratipakṣasādhana-vihīnā'. 'Pratipakṣa' means counter-conception. 'Vitaṇḍā' or Destructive criticism is without a counter-conception in the sense that there is no establishing of the counter-conception. In other words, 'Pratipakṣa' is the critic's (Vaitaṇḍika's) own view (Prativādinaḥ ātmīyaḥ pakṣaḥ) as against view of the first debator (Pūrvavādīpakṣāpekṣayā). 'Vitaṇḍā' is thus the objection raised by the critic, without the establishing of his own view. This is what is meant by Gautama when he says—"Sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīnaḥ vitaṇḍā" (Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 3). The fact that there is no attempt at establishing his own view does not mean that the critic has no view of his own. He does have a view of his own. Yet he does not make any direct attempt at establishing it. When his opponent's view is rejected he feels that his work is over or that his view is indirectly proved right. Haribhadra's cryptic definition of 'Vitaṇḍā' as 'yā pratipakṣavivarjitā' should be understood in the light of the above discussion; otherwise, it is misleading.

It may be noted here that Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are three kinds of 'Kathā' or Discussion. Vāda is 'tattva-bubhutsukathā' (Discussion of those who desire to arrive at truth); Jalpa is 'Vijigīṣukathā' (Disputation carried out by one who desires to score la victory over the opponent by means of 'Chala', etc.); Vitaṇḍā is 'Pratipakṣasādhana-hīnā kathā' (Jalpa or vijigīṣukathā without the establishing of the critic's own view—pratipakṣa).

The author now refers to Hetvābhāsa, Chala and defines Jāti:

हेत्वाभासा असिद्धाद्याश्छलं कूपो नवोदकः ।

जातयो दूषणाभासाः पक्षादिदूष्यते न येः

॥ ३१ ॥

Fallacies are Asiddha (unproved probans), etc. Quibble is (like) 'Kūpo navodakaḥ' [the well has fresh (nine) water (s)]. Refutations are apparent objections which cannot make the (pakṣa), etc., defective. (31)

Hetvābhāsa—hetuvadābhāsata iti hetvābhāsaḥ, that which appears like a probans but is not really so. Hetvābhāsa are the cases of fallacious probans.

There are five kinds of fallacious probans, namely (i) Asiddha, (ii) Viuddha, (iii) Anāikāntika, (iv) Kālātyayāpa-diṣṭa, and (v) Prakaraṇasama.

(i) Asiddha—This is the fallacy of the unproved probans. When this 'hetu' is not proved, it is in the same situation as the probandum. Thus it is also called 'Sādhya-sama'—'Sādhya-viśiṣṭaḥ sādhya-tvāt sādhya-samaḥ' (Nyāyasūtra, I. ii. 8). This fallacy arises when the condition that the probans must be present in the Pakṣa (pakṣadharmatā) is violated. That is, when the subsistence of the 'hetu' in the pakṣa is as unsettled as that of the 'sādhya', there is the Hetvābhāsa called Asiddha or Sādhya-sama. For example, in 'Chāyā dravyam, gatimattvāt' (Shadow is a substance, because it has movement), 'dravyatva' of 'Chāyā' is the probandum, and the probans adduced is 'gatimattva'. The very 'hetu', 'gatimattva of chāyā', is to be proved and hence is 'asiddha'. As it is as unproved as the probandum, it is 'Sādhya-sama'. This is the first fallacious probans (Hetvābhāsa).

[Vātsyāyana does not mention the varieties of Asiddha. The 'Tātparyāṭikā' shows that Gautama's definition of Asiddha is meant to include four kinds of it, viz., Svarūpā-siddha, Ekadeśāsiddha, Āśrayāsiddha and Anyathāsiddha. These are later reduced to three, as Āśrayāsiddha, Svarūpā-

siddha and Vyāpyatvasiddha (Annambhaṭṭa: Tarkasaṅgraha)].

(ii) Anaikāntika—This is the fallacy of the irregular probans—‘Anaikāntikaḥ savyabhicāraḥ’ (Nyāyasūtra, I. ii. 5); ‘Ekasminnante yo niyataḥ sa ekāntaḥ, na ekāntaḥ yaḥ sa anaikāntikaḥ’. For example, ‘Nityaḥ śabdaḥ, asparsātvāt. Here ‘nityatva’ is one ‘anta’ (point) and ‘anityatva’ is another ‘anta’. That probans which subsists in or is concomitant with one ‘anta’, either ‘nityatva’ or ‘anityatva’, is called ‘Ekāntika’. But if it is concomitant with both the probandum and its contrary (nityatva and anityatva), it is called ‘Anaikāntika’. It is inconclusive (Savyabhicāra). In other words, it arises due to the violation of another condition of valid probans, namely, ‘Vipakṣe nāstītā’. For instance in ‘Parvato vahnimān, prameyatvāt’ (The hill has fire, because it is knowable), the probans, prameyatva (knowability), is found both in the ‘sapakṣa’ like kitchen and the ‘vipakṣa’ like a lake. It is concomitant with both the ‘anta’s namely, vahnimattva and avahnimattva, the probandum and its contrary.

[Later Naiyāyikas consider this as one kind of Savyabhicāra called ‘Sādhāraṇa’ (too wide hetu). Two other kinds of Savyabhicāra called ‘Asādhāraṇa’ and ‘Anupasaṃhāri’ are enumerated and defined. ‘Asādhāraṇa’ is when the probans is present only in the ‘pakṣa’ but neither in the ‘sapakṣa’ nor in the ‘vipakṣa’ (e.g., Śabdo nityaḥ, śabdatvāt). ‘Anupasaṃhāri’ is the probans which is non-exclusive, as the ‘pakṣa’ here is all inclusive and leaves nothing by way of ‘sapakṣa’ or ‘vipakṣa’ (e.g., Sarvam-anityam, prameyatvāt)].

(iii) Viruddha—It is a contradictory probans. Gautama defines it as ‘Siddhāntamabhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ’ (Nyāyasūtra, I. ii. 6)—a certain doctrine having been accepted, the probans contradictory to it is called as

‘Viruddha’. It is clear from the Nyāyabhāṣya that here the hetu is contradictory to some doctrine which its propounder has already accepted. For instance: The Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra (III. 13) makes two statements: (1) So’yam vikāro vyakterapaiti, nityatvapratishedhāt. (2) Apeto’pyasti vināśa-pratishedhāt. The first statement says that this world being a modification, ceases from manifestation, because its eternality is denied. Here the probans is ‘nityatvapratishedha’ (the denial of eternality). This is certainly contradictory to the doctrine enunciated in the second statement—‘Even when thus ceasing, it continues to exist, because its utter destruction is denied. The doctrine of ‘vināśapratishedha’ is already accepted by the Yoga philosopher. Then the hetu ‘nityatvapratishedha’ given in the first statement is contradictory (Viruddha).

[The account of Viruddha given by later Naiyāyikas is different from the one given above. Later Naiyāyikas define it as that ‘hetu’ which proves the contrary of the proposition which it is put forward to prove—‘Sādhya-muddiśya tatsādhanāya prayukto yo vastugatyā sādhyā-bhāvavyāpyo hetuḥ’ (Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa). This may be briefly put in Annambhaṭṭa’s words as ‘Sādhya-bhāvavyāpto heturviruddhaḥ’ (Tarkasaṅgraha). For instance: ‘Śabdo nityaḥ, kṛtakatvāt’. Here the probans, ‘kṛtakatva’, instead of proving the probandum (Sādhya), ‘nityatva’, in the pakṣa, proves the absence of it (anityatva), because this probans is concomitant with ‘anityatva’ (Sādhya-bhāva—nityatvābhāva). Here the probans itself disproves the original proposition, while in Savyabhicāra (Anaikāntika) the probans only fails to prove the conclusion because it is found both in the ‘sapakṣa’ and the ‘vipakṣa’.]

(iv) Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa or Kālātita—It is a mistimed probans, according to Gautama—‘Kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ kālātitaḥ’ (Mistimed probans is that which, as adduced, is behind time). Vātsyāyana explains that when one factor (ekadeśa)

of a thing is found to be affected by lapse of time, it is said to be adduced behind time. For instance: 'Śabdo nityaḥ saṃyogavyāṅgyatvāt, rūpavat'. 'Rūpa' (form) is manifested by the conjunction of light with a jug (Ghaṭapradīpa-saṃyoga). Likewise sound (Śabda) is manifested by the conjunction of the drum and the stick (Bherīdaṇḍasaṃyoga) or of the axe and the wood (Dāruparaśusaṃyoga). Now the 'rūpa' that is manifested by 'Pradīpaghaṭasaṃyoga' was in existence before and after it was manifested. Likewise the 'śabda' which is manifested by 'Bherīdaṇḍasaṃyoga' or 'Dāruparaśusaṃyoga' was in existence before and after it was manifested. On the basis of being manifested by conjunction, sound should not be regarded as eternal, because the probans so adduced is behind time and hence, not valid.

The conception of this fallacy has undergone complete change at the hands of later Naiyāyikas. They regard that probans as 'Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa' (one affected by lapse of time) which is found to be opposed to a fact well ascertained by some other pramāṇa—"Pratyakṣānumānāgamaviruddha-pakṣavṛttiḥ kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ" (Mañibhadra). When, for instance, the coolness of fire (Vahneranuṣṇatva) is adduced as a probans to prove the eternity of fire (Vahneranityatvam), there is this fallacy, because the coolness of fire is opposed to the fact ascertained by 'Pratyakṣapramāṇa'.

[In accordance with the above view, the later Naiyāyikas call this as 'Bādhita' or Annulled probans. —'Yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niścitaḥ sa bādhitaḥ (Annam-bhaṭṭa: Tarkasaṅgraha)].

(v) Prakaraṇasama—It is the probans which creates suspense. This is defined by Gautama as—"Yasmāt prakaraṇacintā nirṇayārthamapadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ" (Nyāyasūtra, I. ii. 7), i.e., that probans which, being put forward to establish a definite conclusion, gives rise to

suspense with regard to the point at issue, is called 'Prakaraṇa-sama'.

Prakaraṇa stands for two opposite views on a doubtful question, neither of which is definitely ascertained—"Yimar-śādhiṣṭhānau pakṣapratipakṣau ubhau anavasitau prakaraṇam" (Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya). For instance, in the case of sound, 'sound is eternal' is one view and 'sound is non-eternal' is another view. 'Cintā' is suspense in regard to such point of issue. It consists in the desire to ascertain the truth. If the probans, which is put forward to establish the definite conclusion, gives rise to such a suspense, it is called 'Prakaraṇasama'. For instance: 'Śabdo anityaḥ nityadharmānupalabdheḥ'. Here the probans, 'nityadharmānupalabdhi', instead of clearing the doubt, gives rise to a suspense in the mind of the hearer, because in 'śabda', properties of an eternal thing are not found as much as the properties of a non-eternal thing are not found. The argument may take these lines: "Yadi nityadharmānupalabdheḥ śabdo anityaḥ tarhi anityadharmānupalabdheḥ śabdo nityaḥ kiṃ na syāt." Thus it is similar to the point of issue.

[The 'Tātparyāṭikā' explains that the probans, 'nityadharmānupalabdhi' is neutralised because the other probans, 'anityadharmānupalabdhi' adduced to prove the opposite of what is intended to be proved by 'nityadharmānupalabdhi', is equally strong. Here one probans is counterbalanced by another probans. This leads us to the later conception of 'Satpratipakṣa', which is defined as 'Yasya sādhyābhāva-sādhakam hetvantaram vidyate saḥ satpratipakṣaḥ' (Satpratipakṣa is that probans which has an opposite probans proving the absence of the probandum). For instance: 'Śabdo nityaḥ, śrāvaṇatvāt'. Here the probans, 'śrāvaṇatva' (audibility) is counterbalanced by another probans, 'kāryatvāt', in the counter-argument 'Śabdo anityaḥ, kāryatvāt'.]

The next principle is 'Chala', which consists in opposing an assertion through the assumption of an alternative meaning—"Vacanavighāto arthavikalpopapattyā chalam" (Nyāyasūtra, I. ii. 10). That is, Chala or Quibble is the bringing forward of a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous sense. For example:

(1) Kūpo navodakah

(2) Navakambalo ayam mānavakah.

When this is said, the 'Chalavādin' condemns this by taking the alternate sense of 'nava' as nine (navasamkhyā). His refutation will be in the form of 'Kūtaḥ ekaḥ eva kūpaḥ navasamkhyodakah' or 'Kūtaḥ ekaḥ eva mānavakah navasamkhyakambalopetaḥ'. Thus while the speaker uses the word 'nava' in the sense of 'new', the opponent (Chalavādi) assigns a meaning other than the one intended by the speaker.

The examples quoted bring out one kind of 'Chala' called 'Vākchala' (Verbal). There are the other two kinds of 'Chala' called 'Sāmānyachala' (Generalising) and 'Upacārachala' (Figurative). Sāmānyachala—Example: 'Aho nu khalvasau Brāhmaṇo vidyā-ācarāṇasampannaḥ'. When the speaker says as above, the opponent (Chalavādi) generalises on that and says—"Yadi Brāhmaṇe vidyā-ācarāṇasampadbhavati vrātye api sā bhavet, vrātyo api Brāhmaṇa eva". Thus the opponent proceeds to show the absurdity of the speaker's assertion. Upacārachala—Example: 'Mañcāḥ krośanti'. Here the secondary meaning is intended as 'Mañcasthāḥ puruṣāḥ krośanti'. But the opponent asks 'Kathamacetanā mañcāḥ krośanti'. The denial of the speaker's statement is on the basis of the primary sense of 'mañcāḥ'.

Jāti—Futile rejoinders (Jātayaḥ) are defined as apparent objections, which cannot make the 'Pakṣa', etc., defective. They are self-destructive arguments, which cannot disprove

the matter at hand (Pakṣa—the speaker's view). As Gautama says, Jāti is the objection taken on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity—"Sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām pratyavasthānam Jātiḥ". Since it is an apparent objection, it cannot make the Pakṣa defective. When the debator (Vādi) puts forward a 'hetu' or a 'hetvābhāsa', the objection taking the form of an imitation of it (hetu or hetvābhāsa), raised by the opponent to whom its correctness or otherwise is not clear, is called Jāti.

There are twenty-four kinds of Jāti, viz., (1) Sādharmyasamā, (2) Vaidharmya-samā, (3) Utkarṣasamā, (4) Aparkarṣasamā, (5) Varṇyasamā, (6) Avarṇyasamā, (7) Vikalpasamā, (8) Sādhya-samā, (9) Prāpti-samā, (10) Aprāpti-samā, (11) Prasāṅgasamā, (12) Pratiḍṣṭāntasamā, (13) Anutpattisamā, (14) Saṁśayasamā, (15) Prakaraṇasamā, (16) Ahetusamā, (17) Arthāpattisamā, (18) Avišeṣasamā, (19) Upapattisamā, (20) Upalabdhisamā, (21) Anupalabdhisamā, (22) Nityasamā, (23) Anityasamā and (24) Karyasamā.

(1) Sādharmyasamā (Parity per similarity): This is the apparent objection on the basis of similarity. For example: 'Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād-ghaṭavat—to this, the opponent may object on these lines—"Yadyanityaghaṭasādharmyāt kṛtakatvādanityaḥ śabdaḥ, tarhi nityākāśasādharmyādamūrtatvānnityaḥ syāt"

[Vide Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's commentary for the other kinds of Jāti].

Now the author deals with the last and sixteenth principle called 'Nigrahasthāna':

निग्रहस्थानमाख्यातं परो येन निगृह्यते ।

प्रतिज्ञाहानिसंन्यासविरोधादिविभेदवत्

॥ ३२ ॥

Nigrahasthāna (Point of the opponent's defeat) is that by which an opponent is defeated. It is of many kinds as

‘Pratijñāhāni’, ‘Pratijñāsamnyāsa’, ‘Pratijñāvirodha’, etc. (32).

‘Nigrahassthāna’ is a case of misapprehension and incomprehension—‘Vipratipattirapratipattiśca nigrahassthānam” (Nyāyasūtra: I. ii. 19). A man who misapprehends or who is ignorant becomes defeated; Nigrahassthāna consists in his defeat.

[Vide Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana’s commentary for the varieties of Nigrahassthāna.]

3. SĀṆKHYA-DARŚANA

The Sāṅkhya is one of the oldest systems. There are references to the Sāṅkhya doctrines in some Upaniṣads. For instance, Kaṭhapaniṣad (I. 3. 10–11): “Indriyebhyaḥ parā hyarthā arthebhyasā param manaḥ. Manasastu parā buddhiḥ buddherātmā mahān paraḥ. Mahataḥ parama-vyaktaṁ avyaktātpuruṣaḥ paraḥ. Puruṣāṇa param kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ”. Two lines of thought are pointed out in the Upaniṣads—one in which the conception of Brahman has reached a supreme level, with the reality and truth of the world tacitly ignored and the other which regards the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire and earth. The former makes way for the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya and the latter shows that the Sāṅkhya thought had considerably developed.

Next in the Mahābhārata XII. 318, three schools of Sāṅkhya are mentioned: (1) that admitted twenty-four categories, (2) that admitted twenty-five categories, and (3) that admitted twenty-six categories. The Bhagavadgītā devotes its second chapter for Sāṅkhyayoga: “Eṣa te’bhihitā sāṅkhye buddhiryoge tvimāṁ śṛṇu” (II. 39). Further Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Vedāntasūtra, repeatedly refers to the view whether the Sāṅkhya can be regarded as the teaching of the Upaniṣads and rejects it. (For instance: I. i. 5–11). The strong attempts of Bādarāyaṇa at rejecting the claims of the Sāṅkhya presupposes that some thinkers of that school had held that their doctrine was the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Hence, it is highly probable that the Sāṅkhya in the beginning was theistic, but later on it rejected the theistic spirit and was content with spiritualistic pluralism and atheistic realism. It is also probable that in this later stage it lent some suggestions to the Jaina and the Buddhist

systems and borrowed some suggestions from them. To this stage perhaps belongs the account of the Sāṅkhya system found in the 'Śārīra-saṃhitā of Caraka'.

These references show that the Sāṅkhya was one of the oldest systems of Indian Philosophy. Tradition regards Kapila as the founder of this system. But the 'Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra' attributed to him is generally regarded as a work of fourteenth century, because it has not been referred to by the earlier writers of other schools, while it criticises other later systems. We must either assume that the work of Kapila has lost its original character due to interpolations and modifications or reject that it is not the work of Kapila at all. As Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha, it seems certain that Kapila was a historical personage. The Mahābhārata XII. 219 summarises the views of Pañcaśikha, who is regarded as the direct disciple of Āsuri, the pupil of Kapila. Āsuri's account of the system is shown by Dasgupta as the same as Caraka's. This account is regarded as representing the views of an early school founded by Kapila. The main features of this school are:

1. Puruṣa is in the state of 'Avyakta'.
2. By a conglomeration of this Avyakta with its later products another conglomeration is formed—which generates the so-called living being.
3. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva, the good effects.
4. The ultimate state of emancipation is absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman-state.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa's 'Sāṅkhya-kārikā' is the earliest available and the most popular work of this system. Īśvarakṛṣṇa (assigned to 200 A.D.) has been regarded as the represen-

tative of the classical Sāṅkhya, which had gradually divorced itself from the Upaniṣads under the influence of Jainism and Buddhism, which maintains a clear-cut dualism between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and the plurality of Puruṣas and which is silent about God. The 'Sāṅkhya-kārikā' in its seventy stanzas (which give it the name Sāṅkhya-saptati) gives "a brief but lucid exposition of the theoretical teaching of the system...". It is commented upon by Rājā and Gauḍapāda. Vācaspatiśrī has written another commentary called 'Tattvakaumudī'.

The 'Tattva-samāsa' is another work of note. A third work of importance is the 'Sāṅkhya-sūtra' ascribed to Kapila and commented upon by Vijñāna Bhikṣu. It is in six chapters, four of which are concerned with the elucidation of the doctrine; the fifth criticises the rival views and the sixth gives the parables (Ākhyāyikās) illustrating the chief tenets of the doctrine. In the commentary of Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the Sāṅkhya appears considerably modified. The general effect of the modification is that it brings the Sāṅkhya nearer to the Vedānta.

The author introduces the Sāṅkhyadarśana:

नैयायिकमतस्यैवं समासः कथितोऽधुना ।

सांख्याभिमतभावानामिदानीमयमुच्यते

॥ ३३ ॥

Thus we have given an epitome of the Naiyāyika system. Now we speak of the principles acceptable to the Sāṅkhyas. (33)

Here the author proposes to speak of the twenty-five tattvas admitted by the Sāṅkhya system.

The author now refers to Prakṛti, the first principle of the Sāṅkhyas:

एतेषां या समावस्था सा प्रकृतिः किलोच्यते ।

प्रधानाव्यक्तशब्दाभ्यां वाच्या नित्यस्वरूपिका

॥ ३४ ॥

The Prakṛti of these (Sāṅkhyas) is the state of equilibrium (of the three guṇas). It is designated by the appellations Pradhāna (the Prime entity) and Avyakta (the Unmanifest) and is of eternal nature. (34)

Prakṛti is said to be 'the unity of three guṇas held in equilibrium' (Guṇānām sāmāyāsthā). The three 'guṇas' are 'sattva', 'rajas' and 'tamas' (Stanza 36). They are not to be understood as the qualities which the Prakṛti, the substance, possesses. It is they that constitute Prakṛti. They are the factors, the constituents or the elements of Prakṛti.

As the first principle of the universe, Prakṛti is 'Pradhānam'. It is also called 'Avyakta' because it is the unmanifest state of all effects—(when the three guṇas are held in equilibrium). It is called 'Anumāna' because it is extremely subtle and imperceptible and is inferred from its products. As it is unintelligent and unconscious, it is 'Jaḍa'. It is ever active and unlimited in power; and hence, it is called 'Śakti'.

The Sāṅkhyas adduce five proofs to prove the existence of Prakṛti:

(i) All individual things are limited and finite; a finite cannot be the cause. (Bhedānām parimāṇāt). The infinite and unlimited Prakṛti can alone be the cause of these.

(ii) All things possess certain common characteristics in as much as they produce pleasure, pain or indifference. (Bhedānām samanvayāt). There must be a common source composed of three guṇas which give rise to those feelings.

(iii) All things are effects arising from the activity of the potent cause. (Bhedānām kāryataḥ pravṛtteḥ). There must be a world-cause in which the evolutionary activity is inherent. That is the Prakṛti.

(iv) The effect differs from the cause (Kāraṇakārya-vivibhāgāt). The effects point to a world-cause where they are potentially contained. That is the Prakṛti.

(v) The unity of the universe point to a single cause (Vaisvarūpyasyāvibhāgāt). That cause is Prakṛti.

Bhedānām parimāṇāt samanvayāt
kāryataḥ pravṛtteṣā.

Kāraṇakāryavibhāgādavibhāgadvaiśvarūpyasya.

—(Sāṅkhyakārikā, 15)

Thus Prakṛti is (1) the root-cause of the universe, (2) the uncaused cause in which all worldly effects are latent, and (3) the potentiality of nature, 'the receptacle and nurse of all generation' [Ajāmekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjāmānām namāmaḥ—Tattvakaumudī].

The concept of Prakṛti is virtually a natural development from the theory of causation acceptable to the Sāṅkhyas. Causation to them is a real transformation of the material cause (Pariṇāma). The basic question of causation is: 'Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause? To this question the Sāṅkhyas answer in the affirmative. They are thus called 'Satkāryavādins'. The effect is not a new creation but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause (Prakṛti). Causation is thus the real transformation of Prakṛti, the material cause. Hence their theory of causation is called 'Prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda'. [Although the Rāmānuja system of Vedānta, the Śāṅkara system of Vedānta, the Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda systems of the Bauddhas contribute to the view of the Sāṅkhyas so far as 'Satkāryavāda' is concerned, they all differ from the Sāṅkhya doctrine in other respects. The Rāmānuja-system differs from the Sāṅkhyas in as much as the material cause according to it is 'Brahman' (but not Prakṛti) and its theory of causation is called 'Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda'. The Śāṅkara-system, the Śūnya-

vāda and Vijñānavāda take altogether a different stand from that of both the Sāṅkhya and Rāmānuja systems. They believe that the effect, though sat-kārya, is an unreal appearance of its material cause. They are thus called 'Vivartavādins'. Depending upon their conception of the material cause, their theories of causation are called 'Brahmavivartavāda' (Advaita), 'Śūnyatā-vivartavāda' (Śūnyavāda) and 'Vijñānavivartavāda' (Vijñānavāda). As against all these are the views of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, the Hīnayāna Buddhists and the Cārvākas, who believe that the effect is a new creation, a real beginning and are therefore called 'Asatkāryavādins' or Ārambhavādins'. The theories of causation of the Cārvākas, the Hīnayāna Buddhists and the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas are respectively called 'Svabhāvavāda', 'Anitya-paramāṇuvāda' (Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda) and 'Nitya-paramāṇuvāda'.

The Sāṅkhyas establish their 'Satkāryavāda' with the following proofs:

- (i) The effect must pre-exist in its cause; otherwise it becomes mere non-entity and can never be manifested (Asadakaraṇāt).
- (ii) The effect is invariably connected with its material cause (Upādānagrahaṇāt).
- (iii) Everything cannot be manifested from out of anything in which it is not potentially contained before its manifestation (Sarvasambhavābhāvāt).
- (iv) Evolution is only an actualisation of the potential. Only an efficient cause can manifest that for which it is potent (Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt).
- (v) The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it (Kāraṇabhāvāt).

This theory that causation is a real manifestation of what is potentially contained in the material cause leads to

the concept of Prakṛti as the root-cause of the world of objects. It may be noted here that the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas, which is called Prakṛti, should not be mistaken for a passive state, because Prakṛti is essentially dynamic. When the three 'guṇas' are held in equilibrium, the change is homogeneous (Sarūpaḥ sadṛśaḥ sajātiyo vā pariṇāmaḥ). Thus it is the state of utmost tension. As long as that homogeneous change takes place or the forces of the three guṇas are equal and balanced with one another, so long will the equilibrium be maintained and so long will be the state of Prakṛti.

Now the author refers to the two branches of the Sāṅkhya and to the number of principles acceptable to both:

सांख्या निरीश्वरा केचित्केचिदीश्वरदेवताः ।

सर्वेषामपि तेषां स्यात्तत्त्वानां पञ्चविंशतिः ।

॥ ३५ ॥

Some Sāṅkhyas are atheistic and some are theistic. According to all of them, there are twenty-five principles. (35)

The distinction is here between the Sāṅkhyas that admit 'Īśvara' (God) and those that do not admit 'Īśvara'. The 'Seśvara-sāṅkhyas' are the 'Yoga' philosophers. The acknowledgement of God by the Yoga and the denial of God by the Sāṅkhya marks the main theoretical difference between the two systems, Yoga and Sāṅkhya. The 'Nirīśvara-sāṅkhya' denies God, as it feels confident that Puruṣa and Prakṛti are enough to explain all this variety of worldly existence, its evolution and dissolution.

All Sāṅkhyas recognise twenty-five principles—Prakṛti and her twenty-three evolutes and Puruṣa. Prakṛti is the first principle (Pradhāna). We have noted above (Stanza 34) that Prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the three 'guṇas'. When this equilibrium of the three 'guṇas' is disturbed, there follows evolution. Before dealing with evolution,

it is necessary to know the conception of the three guṇas. The author refers to them in the next stanza:

सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्चेति ज्ञेयं तावद्गुणत्रयम् ।

प्रसादतोषदैत्यादिकार्यलिङ्गं क्रमेण तत्

॥ ३६ ॥

Goodness, activity and inertia—these are known as the three qualities (guṇas). They are inferred from the effects of equanimity, stimulation and apathy respectively. (36)

‘Guṇa’ means ‘quality’, ‘secondary’ and ‘strand of a rope’. Sattva, rajas and tamas are qualities, as they are the elements of Prakṛti. They are secondary as they are subservient to the end of Puruṣa. They are intertwined like the three strands of a rope to make up Prakṛti.

(i) Sattva, which literally means ‘real’ or ‘existent’, is the principle of manifestation. It is called ‘goodness’ and produces pleasure (sukha). It is buoyant (laghu) and illuminating (prakāśaka). Luminosity of light, power of reflection, upward movement, pleasure, happiness, contentment, bliss, are all due to it. From these effects (Kārya), Sattvaguna is inferred. Its colour is white (Śukla).

(ii) Rajas, which literally means ‘foulness’, is the principle of motion. It produces pain (duḥkha). It is mobile (cala) and stimulating (upaśāmbhaka). Restless activity, feverish effort, wild stimulation are its effects, from which its existence is inferred. Its colour is red (Lohita).

(iii) Tamas, which literally means ‘darkness’, is the principle of inertia. It produces apathy and indifference. It produces delusion (moha). Ignorance, sloth, confusion, bewilderment, passivity, negativity are all its results, from which its existence is inferred. It is heavy (guru) and enveloping (varaṇaka). Its colour is dark (kṛṣṇa). It is opposed to ‘sattva’ because it is ‘guru’ and ‘varaṇaka’. It is opposed to ‘rajas’ because it arrests activity.

Thus these three guṇas are not the ordinary qualities like the guṇas of the ‘Nyāya-vaiśeṣika’ system, because they themselves possess qualities like lightness, activity, heaviness, etc. These three guṇas constitute Prakṛti and they are never separate. They conflict and yet co-operate. Their co-operation is like that of the oil, the wick and the flame of a lamp. They are also the constituents of the worldly objects, which are the evolutes of Prakṛti.

When the equilibrium of the three guṇas is disturbed, there is evolution. The disturbance of the equilibrium is caused by a heterogeneous change (Virupa- or visadṛśa-pariṇāma) among the guṇas. How is this equilibrium of the guṇas is disturbed? This is a very important question. The Sāṅkhyas hold that the disturbance of the equilibrium of the guṇas which causes evolution is made possible by the contact of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa without Prakṛti is lame and Prakṛti without Puruṣa is blind. Puruṣa needs Prakṛti for enjoyment (bhoga) and for liberation (apavarga). Prakṛti needs Puruṣa in order to be known, to be enjoyed, to be seen. For creation they must unite and co-operate like a lame man and a blind man:

“Puruṣasya darśanārthaṁ kaivalyārthaṁ
tathā pradhānasya ॥

Paṅgvandhavadubhayorapi saṁyogastatkṛtaḥ
sargaḥ ॥”

(Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 21)

This is a Sāṅkhya-paradox that Puruṣa and Prakṛti are absolute and independent and that they co-operate and are interdependent for the purpose of evolution.

The evolutes of Prakṛti, twenty-four, are enumerated as below:

ततः सञ्जायते बुद्धिर्महानिति यकोच्यते ।


अहंकारस्ततोऽपि स्यात्तस्मात्षोडशको गणः

॥ ३७ ॥

स्पर्शनं रसनं घ्राणं चक्षुः श्रोत्रं च पञ्चमम् ।
 पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाण्याहुस्तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाणि च ॥ ३८ ॥
 पायूपस्थवचःपाणिपादाख्यानि मनस्तथा ।
 अन्यानि पञ्चरूपाणि तन्मात्राणीति षोडश ॥ ३९ ॥
 रूपात्तेजो रसादापो गन्धाद्भूमिः स्वराद्भ्रमः ।
 स्पर्शाद्वायुस्तथैवं च पञ्चभ्यो भूतपञ्चकम् ॥ ४० ॥

From that arises Buddhi (Intellect) which is called Mahān (the Great). From it arises Ahaṁkāra (the notion of 'I'ness) and from the latter arise the host of sixteen categories—the sense of touch, tongue, nose, eye, ear are said to be the five sense organs; and so are the five motor organs, anus, genital organ, speech, hand and foot; so is mind; the rest are the five kinds of subtle elements; thus the sixteen. From the subtle element of form arises light; from that of taste arises water; from the subtle odour earth is born and from the subtle elements of sound and touch arise space and air respectively; thus the five (gross) elements arise from the five subtle elements. (37-40)

The following table gives the 24 evolutes of Prakṛti.



Prakṛti is the first principle (Pradhāna). The first product of Prakṛti is Buddhi (Mahat). It arises when Sattva predominates. It is the germ of the vast world of objects. It is distinguished from consciousness. (Puruṣa alone is

pure consciousness.) Puruṣa is reflected in it and then it becomes apparently conscious and intelligent. Its functions are ascertainment and decision. Dharma (virtue), Jñāna (knowledge), Vairāgya (detachment) and Aśvarya are its original attributes. Memories and recollections are stored in Buddhi.

Mahat evolves into Ahaṁkāra, the principle of individuation, whose function is to generate self-sense (Abhimāna—Ego), the notion of 'I' and 'Mine'. Ahaṁkāra is of three kinds—(i) Sāttvika (Vaikārika), when Sattva predominates; it produces Manas, Pañca-jñānendriyas and Pañca-karmendriyas; (ii) Tāmasa (Bhūtādi); it produces Pañca-tanmātras; (iii) Rājasa contributes the energy by which the Sāttvika and Tāmasa produce their respective evolutes. These are the evolutes of Ahaṁkāra viewed from cosmic point of view. Viewed as psychological, the Sāttvika, the Tāmasa and the Rājasa produce respectively good deeds, indifferent acts and evil deeds.

From the five Tanmātras arise the five Mahābhūtas. From Śabda-tanmātra arises Ākāśa, together with the quality of sound; Sparśa-tanmātra combined with Śabda-tanmātra gives rise to Vāyu with the qualities of sound and touch; Rūpa-tanmātra combined with Śabda-tanmātra and Sparśa-tanmātra gives rise to Tejas along with the qualities of form, sound and touch; from Rasa-tanmātra combined with Rūpa, Śabda and Sparśa tanmātras arises Āpaḥ with the qualities of taste, form, sound and touch; Gandha-tanmātra combined with the tanmātras of Rasa, Rūpa, Śabda and Sparśa gives rise to Pṛthivī with the qualities of odour, taste, form, sound and touch.

These twenty-four principles and Puruṣa make up the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas. Puruṣa is neither an evolute of anything nor evolves into anything; it is neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti. Thus of these twenty-five:

- (i) Puruṣa is neither cause nor effect.
- (ii) Prakṛti is only cause and not the effect.
- (iii) Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, Pañcatanmātras—these seven are both causes and effects (Prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ).
- (iv) Manas, Pañca-jñānendriyas, Pañca-karmendriyas and Pañca-mahābhūtas—these sixteen are effects only (Vikṛtayaḥ).

“Mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyah
prakṛtivyikṛtayaḥ sapta;
Ṣoḍaśakastu vikāro na prakṛtirna
vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ.”

(Sāṅkhyakārikā, 3)

The author concludes about the 24 principles, Prakṛti and its evolutes and refers to the nature of the 25th Principle, Puruṣa:

एवं चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वरूपं निवेदितं सांख्यमते प्रधानम् ।

अन्यस्त्वकर्ता विगुणस्तु भोक्ता पुमान्निर्त्यचिदभ्युपेतः ॥ ४१ ॥

Thus the first principle (Prakṛti) is shown in the Sāṅkhya system as manifesting itself in the form of twenty-four principles. Another principle called Puruṣa, the non-doer, one without qualities, the enjoyer and one endowed with eternal consciousness. (41)

Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. It is the principle of pure consciousness. It is the silent witness (Sākṣī), the neutral seer (Madhyastha, Udāsīna-Draṣṭā), the eternal one, which is beyond space, change and activity (Nitya, Kevala, Akartā), which is without qualities (Nistraigunya, Viguṇa). He is the enjoyer (Bhoktā). Five proofs are put forward to prove the existence of Puruṣa:

- (i) Teleological proof: All compound objects exist for the sake of another and that is Puruṣa (Saṅghāta-parārthatvāt).

- (ii) Logical proof: All objects are composed of three guṇas and logically presuppose the existence of the Puruṣa who is the witness of these and who is beyond these (Triguṇā-diviparyayāt).

- (iii) Ontological proof: There must be a transcendental synthetic unity of pure consciousness as the foundation for the co-ordination of all experiences (Adhiṣṭhānāt).

- (iv) Ethical proof: There must be an intelligent principle to experience the worldly products of non-intelligent Prakṛti (Bhoktṛbhāvāt).

- (v) Mystical proof: The desire for liberation implies the existence of a person who can try for and obtain liberation (Kaivalyārtham pravṛtteḥ).

The Sāṅkhyas believe in the plurality of the Puruṣas who are essentially alike and numerically different:

“Jananamaraṇakāraṇānām pratiniya-
mādayugapatpravṛtteśca,

Puruṣabahutvaṁ siddham traigunya-
viparyayaḥcaiva.”

Now the author speaks of the co-operation of Puruṣa and Prakṛti both for evolution and dissolution of the universe:

पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि सांख्यस्यैवं भवन्ति च ।

प्रधाननरयोश्चात्र वृत्तिः पङ्गवन्धयोरिव

॥ ४२ ॥

Thus there are twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas. Here, in the Sāṅkhya-view, the co-operation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is like that between the lame and the blind. (42)

(See under Kārikā 36)

The author now refers to the Sāṅkhya view of liberation and Sāṅkhya epistemology:

प्रकृतिवियोगो मोक्षः पुरुषस्यैवान्तरज्ञानात् ।

मानत्रितयं च भवेत् प्रत्यक्षं लैङ्गिकं शाब्दम्

॥ ४३ ॥

Liberation is the separation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti by virtue of his inner consciousness. There are three means of right knowledge : Perception, Inference and Verbal testimony (43).

Earthly life is filled with three kinds of pain, Ādhyāt-mika, Ādhibhautika and Ādhidaivika. Liberation means complete cessation of all suffering. As long as the Puruṣa forgets his real nature, mistakes his reflection in the Buddhi and identifies himself with the internal organs, the intellect, the ego and the mind, thus forming a relation with the products of Prakṛti, sufferings of all kinds persist and bondage continues. But when by virtue of inner consciousness the Puruṣa achieves a total isolation from the Prakṛti, all pain ceases and liberation dawns. Thus liberation is the return of the Puruṣa to his pure nature as consciousness, beyond time and space, merit and demerit, bondage and liberation. It is to be noted that the Sāṅkhyas regard liberation as a negative state of the cessation of the three kinds of pain, but not as a state of positive bliss.

Now as regards the Pramāṇas, the Sāṅkhya accepts only three, viz., 1. Pratyakṣa—Perception, 2. Anumāna—Inference and 3. Śabda—Verbal testimony. The Sāṅkhya system has not developed the epistemological details separately and seems to have borrowed them from the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. As regards Anumāna and Śabda, this system fully agrees with the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. In the case of Pratyakṣa there is some difference. That difference is mainly due to the view taken of the process of knowing. All experience requires the subject and the object, the knower and the known. Accordingly, in the Sāṅkhya system, neither the Puruṣa by himself nor Mahat or Buddhi by itself can be the subject of experience, because the former is external to everything and the latter is non-sentient (Jaḍa). But both the Puruṣa and the Mahat together can serve as the subject, the Buddhi contributing all the activity involved

in the process of knowing and the Puruṣa lending the element of awareness. Every Jñāna is a state of this blend. The modification of the Buddhi which such a state involves, namely, the non-sentient becoming sentient through the reflection of Puruṣa, is called Vṛtti and the reflection of the Puruṣa in the Buddhi is called Jñāna. The Buddhi, along with Ahaṁ-kāra and its evolutes, the senses, forms the psychic apparatus which mediates between the Puruṣa and the objective world in securing for the former the experiences. Thus as regards perception the Sāṅkhya believes that it is effected by means of an image or idea (Ākāra) of a given object. The object is not transferred to the Buddhi, but the Buddhi itself assumes the form of the object, when a suitable stimulus is received from outside in the form of the presentation of the object to the senses. This modification of the Buddhi is called Vṛtti. "The details of the process of knowing are as follows: The object first impresses one or other of the senses; and the Jñāna that arises then is quite vague and general. It is 'bare awareness' (ālocana-mātra) and marks the Nirvikalpa stage. The first stage in perception does not accordingly refer, as in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, to the isolated and discriminated particular. It becomes properly explicated later when interpreted by the Manas, and is therefore termed 'determinate' or Savikalpaka. Pratyakṣa does not accordingly start here from detached elements and synthesise them, but from an indistinguishable whole into which it introduces order afterwards". (Prof. Hiriyanṇa: Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 285).

4. JAINA-DARŚANA

The term Jaina is connected with 'Jina' which is derived from the Sanskrit root 'Ji'—to conquer and which means 'victor', *i.e.*, one who has conquered his passions and achieved mastery over himself. The creed to which the name 'Jaina-Siddhānta' is applied seems to have arisen much earlier than Buddhism. In the 'Dīghanikāya', there is a reference to Vardhamāna Mahāvīra and Nigaṇṭhanāthaputta, one of the six Tirthaṅkaras known by Vardhamāna's time, and his doctrine of 'Caturyāma-saṃvara'. The older name of this creed was 'Nirgrantha' (Nigaṇṭha in Pāli). Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, who is credited with the significant titles of Jina (Conquerer), Arhat (the Perfect, the Adorable one), is generally taken as the founder of Jainism. But the Jaina tradition believes that their creed is eternal and that it has been revealed in everyone of the endless epochs by the Tirthaṅkaras, of whom Vardhamāna Mahāvīra was the last. Twenty-three Tirthaṅkaras preceded Mahāvīra. The first of the Tirthaṅkaras was Ṛṣabhadeva, whose personal history is recorded in Śrīmad-Bhāgavata (Skandha 5. Chapters 4-6). He was the son of Nābhi, a king of Manu dynasty, and Marudevī, his queen. His glory was widespread. He had a hundred sons, of whom Bharata was the most famous. This account gives a semblance of historicity to Ṛṣabhadeva (Ṛṣabhanātha). Regarding the historicity of the rest of the Tirthaṅkaras, although the detailed account of them is found in the Jaina works, there is some doubt. But Vardhamāna and his immediate predecessor Pārśvanātha were historical personages. It is believed that Pārśvanātha lived in the eighth century B.C., some two hundred and fifty years before Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. His father was Aśvasena, a king of Benares and his mother was Vāmadevī. He is said to have enjoyed a prosperous family life for thirty years before

he renounced his immense wealth and attained Kaivalya through rigorous penance. He propagated his teaching for seventy years.

There seems to be some difference in the teachings of Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra as shown in the available Jaina works. Pārśvanātha has emphasised only four vows (Vratas), Ahimsā (non-violence), Satya (truth), Asteya (non-stealing) and Aparigraha (non-taking), while Mahāvīra has emphasised Brahmacharya (celibacy) also. Pārśvanātha prescribed śvetāmbaratva for monks, while Mahāvīra prescribed nakedness (digambaratva) as the mark of renunciation.

Vardhamāna, the last of the Tirthaṅkaras, was born in Vaiśālī two hundred and fifty years after Pārśvanātha. His parents were Siddhārtha and Trīśalā. The Śvetāmbara-tradition says that he was married to Yaśodā. Later he renounced family life at the age of thirty and undertook a rigorous penance. He attained the Kaivalyajñāna after thirteen years of severe contemplation. Rājagṛha, the Kingdom of Magadha, was the centre of his missionary activity. He propagated the Jaina creed for fifty years and attained Nirvāṇa at the age of eighty-two.

After the death of Mahāvīra, the Jaina faith obtained royal support from a Nanda King of Magadha and King Khāravela of Kalinga who accepted that faith. Candragupta, the founder of the Maurya dynasty in Magadha, too embraced that faith. It was during that period that the faith bifurcated into Śvetāmbara and Digambara. The circumstances responsible for the bifurcation has been given as below: There broke out in Magadha a severe famine during Candragupta's regime. The great Jaina teacher Bhadrabāhu migrated to South India with Candragupta and other followers. Candragupta performed a penance at Śravaṇabelāgoḷa and attained nirvāṇa. Bhadrabāhu returned to Magadha to find to his surprise and shock the changes in the practices

of the Jaina monks under the leadership of a teacher called Saṅghabhadra. The rigorous penance emphasised by the Jaina faith was totally ignored. The wearing of white dress was given religious sanction. Thus by about second century A.D. the two branches of the Jaina faith, Śvetāmbara and Digambara came into existence. So far as the philosophy is concerned there is not much difference between the two. The difference is found only with regard to religious practices. Thus for instance, the Digambaras enforce rigorous religious practices, while the Śvetambaras, in enforcing the practices, slacken them taking the human susceptibilities into consideration. According to the Digambaras the Kevalin should not take food and women are not eligible for mokṣa. But the Śvetambaras do not enforce such restrictions.

“Bhunkte na kevalī na strī
mokṣameti digambaraḥ,
Prāhureṣāmayam bhedo
mahān śvetāmbaraiḥ saha.”

—Jinadattasūri, quoted in the ‘Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha’

The author introduces the Jaina-darśana after concluding his treatment of the Sāṅkhya:

एवं सांख्यमतस्यापि समासः कथितोऽधुना ।
जैनदर्शनसंक्षेपः कथ्यते सुविचारवान्

॥ ४४ ॥

So far an abstract of the Sāṅkhya system is thus given. Now a brief summary of the Jaina system marked with good reasoning, is given. (44)

‘Suvicāravān’ is given as a significant adjective of ‘Jaina-darśana-saṅkṣepaḥ’. What Haribhadrāsūri means by it is this: In other Darśanas, the tenets are broadly developed in conformity with the teachings of the authoritative branches of knowledge such as the Vedas, the Smṛtis

and the Purāṇas. They are not to be refuted by arguments—they say (Na hantavyāni hetubhiḥ). The Jaina challenge is :

“Asti vaktavyatā kācittenedam na vicāryate
Nirdoṣam kāñcanaṃ cetsyāt parīkṣayā bibhēti kim”.

The Jainas claim that they give more importance to reason (yukti) than to tradition:

“Pakṣapato na me vīre
na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu,
Yuktimadvacanam yasya
tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ.”

Now the author refers to the deity of the Jaina system:

जिनेन्द्रो देवता तत्र रागद्वेषविवर्जितः ।

हतमोहमहामलः केवलज्ञानदर्शनः

॥ ४५ ॥

सुरासुरेन्द्रसम्पूज्यः सद्भूतार्थोपदेशकः ।

कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयं कृत्वा सम्प्राप्तः परमं पदम्

॥ ४६ ॥

The deity of this system is Jina, who is free from passion and hatred, who is a great victor over infatuation, who has the omniscient vision, who is adored by the lords of demons and gods, who has taught the true nature of reality and who has attained the highest state after destroying all karmas (fruits of deeds). (45-46)

The word ‘Jina’ means ‘conquerer’, i.e., one who has conquered passions and desires. The term is applied to the liberated souls who have conquered their passions and desires. The liberated souls are called ‘Sāmānyakevalinaḥ’. ‘Jinendra’ means ‘the Lord of the Jinas’, the ‘Tīrthaṅkara’. The Jainas believe in twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras from Rṣabha to Mahāvīra. The last of the Tīrthaṅkaras, Mahāvīra, gave a new orientation to the faith. For all practical purposes he is regarded as the founder of the Jainism as it lives to-day. He is the Devatā in the sense that he is the ‘founder of the faith’ (Darśanapravartaka).

He is 'rāgadveṣavivarjitah'. Rāga (Passion) is attachment to worldly things (Sāmsārikasnehaḥ)—and dveṣa is antipathy resulting in hatred towards beings. Rāga and dveṣa are hard to conquer (durjayau) and are responsible for bondage (bhavasampātahetū). It is they that obstruct liberation (muktipratirodhakau).

'Ko a na labejja mukkhaṃ
rāgaddesā jai na hujjā.'

(Kaśca na labheta mokṣaṃ rāgadveṣau yadi na bhavetām).
Jinendra is free from 'rāga and dveṣa'.

He is 'kevalajñānadarśanaḥ'. Kevalajñāna' is omniscience, the highest kind of knowledge, pure, perfect, direct, immediate and intuitive. It constitutes the essence of the soul in its pure and undefiled condition. It is the state of having the knowledge of all things simultaneously as they are. 'Kevalajñānasya darśanaṃ yasya saḥ'—one who has the omniscient vision of all things as they are. That is the state of mokṣa.

He is 'hatamohamahāmallaḥ'—mohaḥ eva mahāmallaḥ, hataḥ mohamahāmallaḥ yena saḥ. Moha is infatuation created by a desire for mokṣa even through the guidance of the Śāstras that teach violent rites. Such teachings are called 'mohanīyakarma', matter that obscures the right attitude of the soul towards faith and right conduct. "Mohanīyakarmodayāt himsātmakaḥ śāstrebyo'pi muktikāṅkṣaṇādivyāmohaḥ mohaḥ". One should be really strong-willed to set aside such an infatuation which is hard to conquer. Jinendra is acclaimed as the great victor because he has conquered that moha.

He is 'sadbhūtārthopadeśakaḥ'. 'Sat' means 'reality'; that which exists. Sadbhūtārtha is the true nature of reality—Vastusvarūpa or Padārthajñāna. Jinendra has taught the true nature of reality. The fundamental ideas of Jaina ontology are based on his teachings. A thing, according to

the Jaina system, has got infinite number of characteristics and reality has infinite characteristics— "Anantadharmakam vastu, anantadharmātmakameva tattvam" (Hemacandra : Anyayogavyavacchedikā dvātriṃśikā). A thing is observed to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes. For instance, clay assumes various forms such as a jug, a pan, a pot, an idol, etc. According to one extreme view, the clay-matter remains permanent and that alone is true, whereas the changes of form and state are but appearances. That is roughly the Upaniṣadic view :

"Yathā somyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛṇmayam vijñātaṃ syāt vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiket-
yeva satyam."

—Chāndogya, VI. 1.4.

Another extreme view is of the Buddhists who hold that changing qualities alone are perceived and there is no unchanging substance behind them. There are only the momentary passing qualities.

The Jainas take a course between these two extremes and cull out and combine the elements of truth found in both the views. They are of the opinion that it is not true that substance alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it is also not true that there were no permanent qualities. Experience shows that in this context there are three elements : (1) elements that remain unchanged, (2) new elements that are generated, and (3) old elements that are destroyed. Thus substance (Vastu, Padārtha) is that which possesses the three characteristics of production, destruction and permanence : "Utpādayaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṃ sat" (Umāsvāti). Production consists in the new qualities being generated. Destruction is of some old qualities. Permanence belongs to some collocations of qualities which remain unchanged. Thus when a jug is made, the clay-lump is destroyed, the jug is generated and the

clay is permanent. Both the substance (say, clay) and the changing modes (say, pot, jug, etc.) are real. To say that the unchanging substance alone is true is as one-sided and partial view as to say that changing modes are alone real. To mistake any partial view as the whole truth is to commit the fallacy of Ekāntavāda. The Jainas take all these partial views as true only relatively according to one point of view or the other (Naya).

This view has both the metaphysical and the epistemological sides. The metaphysical side of the view that reality has innumerable characteristics, is called 'Anekāntavāda', while the epistemological side of view that we know only some aspects of reality and that all our judgements are necessarily relative, is called 'Syādvāda'.

The fundamental teaching of Syādvāda (see under Kārika 1) is that all truth is relative to our standpoints. The standpoint of thought from which we make a statement of a thing is technically called by the Jainas as 'Naya'. "Ekadeśaviśiṣṭo'rtho nayasya viśayo mataḥ" (Nyāyavatāra). There are in all seven nayas of which the first four are called 'Arthanayas' (those that relate to objects or meanings) and the last three are called 'Śabdanayas' (those that relate to words). (1) Naigama-naya—the standpoint from which we look at a thing as having both universal and particular qualities and fail to distinguish between them. To regard the universals and particulars as separately real and absolute is to commit a fallacy of Naigama-nayābhāsa. (2) Saṅgraha-naya—emphasising the universal qualities and ignoring the particulars. When the universals alone are treated as absolutely real and particulars are rejected as unreal, we commit a fallacy of Saṅgraha-nayābhāsa. (3) Vyavahāra-naya — emphasising concrete particulars and their specific features and ignoring the universals. When particulars alone are regarded as real and universals are rejected as unreal, it becomes a fallacy called Vyavahāra-nayābhāsa.

(4) Rjusūtra-naya—regarding particulars as a series of moments and considering any given moment as real. When this partial truth is mistakenly asserted as the whole truth, it becomes the fallacy of Rjusūtra-nayābhāsa. (5) Sabda-naya—a word is necessarily related to the meaning it conveys. A word refers to a thing, or a quality, or a relation, or an action. (6) Samabhirūḍhanaya—distinguishing terms according to their roots. For example, 'Pañkaja' means 'born of mud'. Its meaning is conventionally restricted to lotus only. (7) Evambhūta-naya—a special form of Samabhirūḍha-naya. According to it a name should be applied to an object only when its meaning is fulfilled. For example, a cow should be called 'gauḥ' only when it moves and not when it is lying down. Nayas are also distinguished as Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika, the former being the point of view of substance which takes the permanent nature and unity of things into account and the latter being the point of view of modes which takes into account the passing modifications and diversity of things. When a thing is regarded as permanent only or momentary only, and as one only or as many only, fallacies arise.

The true nature of reality is thus explained as Anekāntavāda from one point of view and as Syādvāda from another. These Vādas are based on the teachings of Mahāvīra, the Jinendra.

Jinendra is again described to have attained liberation after eradicating the entire karma-matter—"Kṛtsnakarma-kṣayaṃ kṛtvā paramaṃ padaṃ samprāptaḥ." Karma is the link which unites the soul to the body. Ignorance of truth and four passions, krodha, lobha, māna and māyā, are called 'kaṣāyas' or sticky substances where karmic particles stick. They attract the karmic matter to flow towards the soul. The flow of karmic particles is called 'Āśrava'. The state when these particles infiltrate into the soul and bind it, is called 'Bandha' or bondage. By the possession and

practice of right faith, knowledge and conduct, the 'Samvara' state is reached. In this state the fresh influx of karma is stopped. The next stage is called 'Nirjarā' or wearing out, in which the existing karma is exhausted. When the last particle of karma is exhausted, the association between the soul and the matter is dissolved. Then the soul shines in its intrinsic nature of infinite truth, infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power. This state is called Mokṣa. Jinendra is described as having exhausted the entire karma and attained the highest state of Mokṣa.

Now the author enumerates the nine principles accepted by the Jaina system :

जीवाजीवौ तथा पुण्यं पापमाश्रवसंवरो ।

बन्धश्च निर्जराभौ नव तत्त्वानि तन्मते

॥ ४७ ॥

Soul, non-soul, merit, sin, flow of karma, stoppage of karma, bondage, wearing out of karma, and liberation—these are the nine principles (categories) of the Jaina system. (47).

The definitions of these nine tattvas are given here :

तत्र ज्ञानादिधर्मभ्यो भिन्नाभिन्नो विवृत्तिमान् ।

कर्ता शुभाशुभं कर्म भोक्ता कर्मफलस्य च

॥ ४८ ॥

चैतन्यलक्षणो जीवो यश्चैतद्विपरीत्यवान् ।

अजीवः स समाख्यातः पुण्यं सत्कर्मपुद्गलाः

॥ ४९ ॥

पापं तद्विपरीतं तु मिथ्यात्वाद्याश्च हेतवः ।

यस्तैर्बन्धः स विज्ञेय आश्रवो जिनशासने

॥ ५० ॥

संवरस्तन्निरोधस्तु बन्धो जीवस्य कर्मणः ।

अन्योन्यानुगमात्कर्मसम्बन्धो यो द्वयोरपि

॥ ५१ ॥

बद्धस्य कर्मणः शाटो यस्तु सा निर्जरा मता ।

आत्यन्तिको वियोगस्तु देहादिर्मोक्ष उच्यते

॥ ५२ ॥

In the Jaina system, the souls are characterised by consciousness, different and alike depending on the inherent qualities of knowledge, faith and conduct ; they undergo modification and are the agents of good and bad deeds and enjoyers of the fruits of deeds. The Non-soul (Ajīva) is that which is contrary to it (Jīva). Merit is good karmic matter. Sin is its opposite (i.e., bad karmic matter) ; false faith, etc., are its causes. Āśrava or influx of karma is, in the Jaina order, that bondage by them (false faith, etc.). Stoppage of karma (Samvara) is the suspension of the influx of karma. Bondage is the union of the soul and the karma by an intimate interpenetration. Nirjarā (wearing out) is said to be the exhausting of the karma of the bound soul. Liberation is the total separation of the soul from the body, etc. (48-52)

(1) Jīva — 'caitanya-lakṣaṇo Jīvaḥ'. Conscious spirit is the essence of the Jīva. The Jīvas are many. They are different and alike (bhinna and abhinna). In respect of having the quality of consciousness, all Jīvas from the lowest to the highest are alike. But they are different in other respects. They are either bound (baddha) or liberated (mukta). The bound souls are either mobile (trasa) or immobile (sthāvara). The mobile souls are classified as those that have two senses (worms, etc.), those that have three senses (ants, etc.), those that have four senses (wasps, bees, etc.) and those that have five senses (higher animals and men). The immobile souls differ again as they live in the atoms of earth, water, fire or air, or in the vegetable kingdom and have only one sense (touch). Thus Jīvas are different. They are thus qualitatively alike and quantitatively different.

The Jīva is 'Vivṛttimān' or 'Pariṇāmavān' (undergoes modification). The soul by itself has no form. But it takes the form of the body which it illuminates. The soul of an ant, for instance, is as big as the body of it and that of an elephant is as big as the elephant itself. Thus it assumes different forms.

The Jiva is the real agent of good or bad deeds and is the real enjoyer of the fruits of deeds.

The soul in its intrinsic nature possesses infinite faith (anantadarśana), infinite knowledge (anantajñāna), infinite bliss (anantasukha) and infinite power (anantavīrya), which are called the four infinities (Anantacatuṣṭaya). In the case of bound souls these characteristics are obscured by karma.

(2) Ajīva — tadvaiparītyavān, i.e., Jivavaiparītyavān, that which is contrary to the Jiva. In other words the Ajīva is bereft of consciousness (acetanaḥ). It is divided into matter (Pudgala), space (Ākāśa), motion (Dharma), inertia (Adharma) and time (Kāla). These are all without life and consciousness. Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa along with Jiva are called 'Astikāyadravyas' because they possess constituent parts extending in space. Kāla alone is called 'Anastikāyadravya' because it has no extension in space. Of the Ajīvas, Pudgala means that which is liable to integration and disintegration — pūrayanti galanti ca (Pudgalāḥ). An atom is considered to be the smallest and indivisible unit of matter. The compound objects (saṅghāta or skandha) of the world, including the senses, mind and breath, are the combinations of atoms. Pudgala possesses four qualities of rūpa, rasa, gandha and sparśa. Śabda is not regarded as a quality but only as a modification of matter. According to Jaina system, atoms are qualitatively alike and indistinguishable. (This is not in conformity with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stand). They become differentiated by developing the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. Matter in its subtle form constitutes karma which infiltrates into the souls and binds them to saṃsāra.

(3) and (4) Puṇya and Pāpa — The atoms of karma are attracted towards the souls according to their modifications (Parīṇāma). If the karmic atoms are attracted by the meritorious modifications of souls, they become satkarma-

pudgalāḥ, good karmic matter which is Puṇya (merit). If they are attracted by sinful modifications, they turn into duṣkarmapudgalāḥ, bad karmic matter which is Pāpa (sin). False faith (mithyājñāna), attachment (avirati), heedlessness (pramāda) and impurities (kaṣāya) are the causes of Pāpa.

(5) Āśrava — It is the karmic influx into the soul to bind it to saṃsāra.

(6) Saṃvara — It is the stopping of the influx of karma.

(7) Bandha — Bondage is a state when karmic particles infiltrate into the soul and bind it to saṃsāra. In bondage, the Karmic matter unites with the soul by an intimate interpenetration just as water unites with milk — 'Parasparakṣīra-niranyāyena lolībhāvāt dvayorapi jīva-karmaṇoḥ yo sambandhaḥ sa bandhanāma tattvam.'

(8) Nirjarā — It is the exhausting of all karmic matter that exists in the soul.

(9) Mokṣa — We know that passions attract the flow of karmic matter. Passions are due to ignorance and hence, ignorance is the real cause of bondage. Ignorance can only be removed by knowledge. Right knowledge (Samyagjñāna) is the cause of liberation. Right knowledge is produced by right faith (Samyagdarśana — faith in the teachings of the Tirthankaras). Right conduct (Samyakcāritra) perfects Knowledge. Samyagdarśana, Samyakcāritra and Samyagjñāna jointly bring about liberation. These three are called the jewels (Ratnatraya) of the Jainas. The state of Mokṣa is characterised by the 'Anantacatuṣṭaya': Anantasatya, Anantajñāna, Anantasukha and Anantavīrya.

The author now refers to the purpose achieved by heeding to the Jaina-tattvas:

एतानि तत्र तत्त्वानि यः श्रद्धते स्थिराशयः
सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयोगेन तस्य चारित्र्ययोग्यता

तथा भव्यत्वपाकेन यस्यैतत् त्रितयं भवेत् ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रियायोगाज्जायते मोक्षभाजनम्

॥ ५४ ॥

He who heeds in faith to these principles with firm mind, acquires deservingly the right conduct through right faith and right knowledge. (53)

He who attains these three owing to the weakening of the bonds of existence, becomes fit for attaining liberation through the combination of right faith and right knowledge with right conduct. (54)

The author now mentions the Pramāṇas acceptable to the Jainas :

प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्वे प्रमाणे तथा मते ।

अनन्तधर्मकं वस्तु प्रमाणविषयस्त्विह

॥ ५५ ॥

अपरोक्षतयाऽर्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् ।

प्रत्यक्षमितरज्ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया

॥ ५६ ॥

Immediate and mediate are the two Pramāṇas (valid means of knowledge) recognised. The object of the Pramāṇas is the thing possessing infinite characteristics. (55)

Pratyakṣa (immediate) is the knowledge bringing the cognition of the object through the immediate means of senses. The other one is to be known as Parokṣa or mediate with reference to the cognition of the object. (56)

Pramāṇa is the right knowledge of the thing as it is. It is distinguished from 'naya', which is the knowledge of the thing in its relation to a standpoint. Pramāṇa is two fold—Pratyakṣa (immediate) and Parokṣa (mediate).

Pratyakṣa—akṣamākṣam pratigatam jñānam, the knowledge immediately born in the soul through its senses. Akṣa is 'Jīva'—akṣnoti vyāpnoti sakalabhāvān iti. Akṣa is also

'indriya'—aśnute viṣayamityakṣam indriyam. Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manahparyāya (telepathy) and Kevalajñāna (omniscience) are called immediate knowledge (Pratyakṣa or Aparokṣa).

Parokṣajñāna is obtained through the medium of probans (linga) or verbal testimony (Śabda); Mati (Inferential knowledge) and Śruta (knowledge derived through verbal testimony) are called Parokṣa

The author gives the nature of reality in the following stanza :

येनोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं यत्तत्सदिष्यते ।

अनन्तधर्मकं वस्तु तेनोक्तं मानगोचरः

॥ ५७ ॥

By virtue of the fact that reality is characterised by birth, decay and persistence, a thing characterised by innumerable qualities becomes the subject of Pramāṇas. (57)

Refer to the notes under Kārikās 45-46 for the Jaina theory of reality.

The author now concludes his brief account of the Jainadarśana :—

जैनदर्शनसंक्षेप इत्येष कथितोऽनघः ।

पूर्वापरविघातस्तु यत्र क्वापि न विद्यते

॥ ५८ ॥

Thus a brief account of the Jaina system, free from defects, is given. In it, there is not even a slight occasion of contradiction between what is stated earlier and what is stated later. (58)

5. VAIŚEŚIKA-DARŚANA

The name of this philosophical system is derived from the term Viśeṣa. According to this system, it is in the particulars, particular imperceptible souls and atoms, that true individuality is to be found. The souls retain their selfhood in spite of all their cosmic and social relations. Thus this system is more scientific than speculative and more analytic than synthetic.

The impulse behind this system seems to have arisen from a hostility towards the Buddhist phenomenalism. It establishes souls and substances as solid facts. Śaṅkara's criticism (Bra. Sū. Bhā. II. 2. 18) shows that the dominant tendency of the system was in the direction of atheism. In its early form it was thought out in an age full of germs of skepticism. It was mainly a system of physics and metaphysics and logical discussions are skilfully incorporated later.

Garbe (The philosophy of Ancient India, p. 20) has reasonably felt that 'the Vaiśeṣika system seems to be of much greater antiquity than the Nyāya'. The particular precedes the general. Logic is a criticism and a corrective. The Sūtra-work of Kaṇāda and Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Praśastapāda do not show so much the influence of the Nyāya system, while Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya are considerably influenced by the Vaiśeṣika views.

It is supposed that the Vaiśeṣika preceded Buddhism and Jainism. The Buddhist theory of Nirvāṇa is traced to the Asatkāryavāda of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Astikāyas of Jainism and its atomic theory are traced to the Vaiśeṣikas. One of the later Jaina works attributed the authorship of

the Vaiśeṣika system to a Jaina Rohagutta (18 A.D.). This claim that the Vaiśeṣika system is an offshoot of Jainism is hardly justifiable. The atomic theory, the classification of substances and acceptance of two means of knowledge strongly suggest that the Vaiśeṣika arose about the time of Buddha and Mahāvira (6th-5th cent. B.C.)

The first systematic exposition of the system is found in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇāda. It is also called Aulūkyad-rāṣana. Kāśyapa is the real name of the author. This work is divided into 10 Books. The first Book discusses five categories, Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya and Viśeṣa. The second deals with the different substances, excepting Ātman and Manas. The third speaks of Ātman, Manas objects of the senses, and nature of inference (Anumāna). The fourth deals mainly with atomic structure of the universe. In the fifth we find the discussion about the nature and kinds of action. In the sixth ethical problems are considered. The seventh contains questions of quality, self and inherence. The eighth, the ninth and the tenth treat of the problems of perception (Pratyakṣa), inference and inherence (Samavāya). This Sūtra work seems to have received additions from time to time. Some of the sūtras found in it are not commented on by Praśastapāda.

Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṅgraha is not so much a commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda as an important independent work on the system. It is difficult to say that Praśastapāda's mature views are simply the development of the suggestions contained in Kaṇāda's work. "Almost all the peculiar doctrines that distinguished the later Vaiśeṣika from the Nyāya and other schools are to be found in Praśastapāda's work and are conspicuously absent in Kaṇāda's sūtras". The account of 24 qualities, the theory of creation and destruction of the world, the statement of fallacies and the nature of inference are distinct additions to Kaṇāda's work. There are a number of commentaries

on, Praśastapāda's work, of which Vyomaśekhara's Vyomāvatī, Śrīdhara's Nyāyakandalī, Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī and Śrīvatsa's Līlāvatī are important.

Both Śrīdhara and Udayana admit the existence of God and accept the category of Abhāva. Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī, Viśvanātha's Bhāṣāpariccheda and Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṅgraha are the important reference books.

Introducing the Vaiśeṣika-darśana, the author remarks:

देवताविषये भेदो नास्ति नैयायिकैः समम् ।

वैशेषिकाणां तत्त्वेषु विद्यतेऽसौ निर्दिश्यते

॥ ५९ ॥

In the case of the deity, the Vaiśeṣikas do not differ from the Naiyāyikas. But with regard to the categories they differ. That difference is pointed out here. (59)

(There is a metrical error in the fourth Pāda. Hence 'nirdiśyate' should be read as 'nivedyate')

Like the Naiyāyikas the Vaiśeṣikas are theists. God (Īśvara) is omniscient, eternal and perfect. Karma, the unseen power of merits and demerits, is unintelligent and needs God as the supervisor and the controller. God is the efficient cause of the world and atoms are its material cause. Atoms and souls are co-present and co-eternal with God, who does not create them. God simply gives motion to the atoms, which go on combining. The Veda is authoritative because it is the word of God.

We have seen that the Naiyāyikas recognise sixteen categories, Pramāṇa, Prameya, etc. The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, recognise six categories (seven with Abhāva later).

The six categories are:

द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म सामान्यं च चतुर्थकम् ।

विशेषसमवायौ च तत्त्वषट्कं हि तन्मते

॥ ६० ॥

Substance, quality, action, generality as the fourth, particularity and inherence, these are the six categories according to them. (60)

Haribhadrāsūri, here, mentions six categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. Abhāva is recognised as the seventh category later. Kaṇāda speaks of Abhāva, but does not give it the status of a Padārtha (category), an object to be thought (jñeya) and named (abhidheya).

Now the author speaks of the varieties of these categories. First he speaks of those of Dravya and Guṇa:

तत्र द्रव्यं नवधा भूजलतेजोऽनिलान्तरिक्षाणि ।

कालदिगात्ममनांसि च, गुणाः पुनश्चतुर्विंशतिधा

॥ ६१ ॥

स्पर्शरसरूपगन्धाः शब्दः सङ्ख्याविभागसंयोगौ ।

परिमाणं च पृथक्त्वं तथा परत्वापरत्वे च

॥ ६२ ॥

बुद्धिः सुखदुःखेच्छा धर्माधर्मौ प्रयत्नसंस्कारौ ।

द्वेषः स्नेहगुरुत्वे द्रवत्ववेगौ गुणा एते

॥ ६३ ॥

Among them, substance is ninefold as earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, spirit and mind. Quality is of twenty-four kinds. Touch, taste, colour, odour, sound, number, conjunction, size, separateness, otherness, oneness, consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, merit, demerit, volition, impression, aversion, attachment, heaviness, liquidity and speed are the qualities. (61-63)

Dravya (substance) is defined as 'Kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇaṃ dravyam', i.e., the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the material cause of the composite objects produced by it. We cannot think of qualities and actions without a substance because they require a substratum. The substances in their simple, ultimate form are eternal and are not subject to production and destruction. They are the material causes of the

compound objects. The substances are nine; this list consists of both material and spiritual substances. Of these nine, Pṛthivī (bhū), Ap (jala), Tejas and Vāyu signify not the compound, transient objects but the ultimate elements. The ultimate elements are the eternal atoms. They are super-sensible, partless and unique. Ākāśa is not atomic. These five are called the five elements (Pañcabhūtas). They are the material substances. Each of them possesses a peculiar quality which distinguishes it from the rest. These peculiar qualities of Pṛthivī, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu and Ākāśa are respectively gandha, rasa, rūpa, sparśa and śabda, which are cognised by the five external senses. The external organs are constituted by the respective elements. Kāla and Dik, like Ākāśa, are one, eternal and all-pervasive (eka, nitya and vibhu). Kāla is the cause of the cognitions of past, present and future and of younger and older. Dik is the cause of cognitions of east and west, here and there, near and far. Ātmas are innumerable, each independent, eternal and all-pervasive. Ātman is the substratum of the qualities of consciousness (buddhi), desire (icchā) and volition (yatna). Manas is the internal sense; it is atomic and yet differs from the first four atomic substances in as much as it does not give rise to compound objects.

Guṇa is an independent reality (Padārtha) as it can be conceived (prameya), thought (jñeya) and named (abhidheya). But it cannot independently exist. Dravya is its substratum. The Guṇas are the static and permanent features of the substances, while actions are the dynamic and transient features. Guṇa is that which inheres in a substance, which does not possess quality or action, which does not produce any compound object, and which is not the cause of conjunction and disjunction (as action is)—Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, I. 1. 16. Qualities are twenty-four.

The author now gives the kinds of Karma and Sāmānya and defines Viśeṣa :

उत्क्षेपावक्षेपावाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनम् ।

पञ्चविधं कर्मेतत्परापरे द्वे तु सामान्ये

॥ ६४ ॥

तत्र परं सत्ताख्यं द्रव्यत्वाद्यपरं अथ विशेषस्तु ।

निश्चयतो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिरन्त्यो विनिर्दिष्टः

॥ ६५ ॥

Karma (action) is five-fold as upward movement, downward movement, contraction, expansion and locomotion. Higher and lower are the two generalities. 'Being' is the higher and 'dravyatva', etc., are the lower. Particularity is, however, pointed out as that ultimate thing residing in eternal substances as their differentium. (64-65)

Karma, like quality, inheres in a substance and cannot exist separately from it. But unlike quality, it is the cause of disjunction and conjunction and is transitory. It is of five kinds.

Sāmānya (generality) is the class-concept or the universal. It is eternal, one and residing in many—'Nityamekamane-kānugataṃ sāmānyam'. It is one while the individuals in which it resides are many; it is eternal while the individuals which it inheres is subject to birth and death, production and destruction. The generalities reside in substances, qualities and actions—'dravyagūṇakarmavṛtti'. They are of two kinds, higher and lower. Being (Sattā) is the higher generality; it includes everything and itself is not included in anything. Every generality ('dravyatva', etc.) other than Sattā is lower, as it includes the individuals of a class and itself is included in Sattā. As generality is that which subsists in many, what subsists in one individual only, for instance, etherness, is not a generality. Although conjunction (Samyoga) inheres in many substances it conjoins, it cannot be a generality because it is not eternal.

Viśeṣa (particularity) enables us to recognise things as different from one another. Every individual is a particular and a unique thing different from all others. This unique-

ness is its particularity. If generality is inclusive, particularity is exclusive. If generality is the basis of assimilation, particularity is the basis of discrimination. It may be noted here that the compound objects of this world are not real particulars. That is why the special category of Viśeṣa need not be recognised to distinguish them as they can be easily distinguished from others on the basis of the difference of their parts. It is only in the case of the simple ultimate substances like atoms, which are otherwise alike, that a need arises to postulate the category of Viśeṣa in order to distinguish them from one another—one atom of an element from another atom of the same element. That is why viśeṣa is described as 'nityadravyavṛtti' and 'antya'. Atoms, souls, space, time and manas have their particularities.

Next the author speaks of Samavāya, the sixth Padārtha:

य इहायुतसिद्धानामाधाराधेयभूतभावानाम् ।

सम्बन्ध इह-प्रत्ययहेतुः प्रोक्तः स समवायः

॥ ६६ ॥

Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things which are inseparable and which are standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained and is the basis of the idea 'this is in that'. (66)

Haribhadrasūri's definition is verbatim the same as Praśastapāda's—'Ayutasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayaheṭuḥ sa samavāyaḥ'. 'Ayutasiddha' means inseparability of things—yayordvayormadhye ekamavinaśyadaparāśritamevāvaṭiṣṭhate tāvayutasiddhau'. The Samavāya exists between such inseparable things as the parts and the whole (avayavāvayavinau), the quality and the substance (guṇa-guṇināu), the action and the substance (kriyā-kriyāvantau), the universal and the individual (jātivyakti) and the particularity and the eternal substance (viśeṣa-nityadravye).

Now the author concludes his epitome of the Vaiśeṣika system after referring to the Pramāṇas accepted by it:

प्रमाणं च द्विधास्मीषां प्रत्यक्षं लैङ्गिकं तथा ।

वैशेषिकमतस्यैवं संक्षेपः परिकीर्तितः

॥ ६७ ॥

According to them (Vaiśeṣikas), there are only two means of valid knowledge—perception and inference. Thus the abstract of the Vaiśeṣika system is given. (67)

The Vaiśeṣikas accept only two Pramāṇas, perception and inference, while the Naiyāyikas recognise four with the inclusion of analogy and verbal testimony.

6. JAIMINĪYA-DARŚANA

This system is generally known as Pūrva-mīmāṃsā or just Mīmāṃsā. The term Mīmāṃsā means 'systematic investigation'. The term shows how even in the doctrines based on Śruti importance was given to reflection. The name Mīmāṃsā is shared by another system called Vedānta, which is based on the latter part of Śruti and called Uttara-mīmāṃsā.

Coming to consider the history of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system, we see that the doctrine in its origin goes back to the Brāhmaṇas, which are the records of the sacrificial system of worship. This sacrificial system began to develop into a network of elaborate rituals the details of which were codified by the priests. On further elaboration of this system there grew a necessity to collect the age-old rules and regulations as tradition had them. It was this necessity that gave rise to the Kalpasūtras. In still later times, thanks to the discussions and doubts about the intricacies of the sacrificial literature in different circles, the Mīmāṃsā arose as a system, which, in course of time, came to be fully developed into a philosophical system with its own ontology and epistemology supplementing ritualism in order to circumvent the attacks by other systems.

The literature of this system is quite vast. Our source-book, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini, is by far the biggest and probably the oldest of the philosophic sūtras. As is evident from the different references that Jaimini makes to the views of other writers, there were different schools of thought on the subject and the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras are a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school. These sūtras were written about 200 B.C. This work

consists of twelve chapters divided into sixty pādas. It considers about a thousand topics.

The earliest commentary available on it is by Śabara-svāmin. Various commentators such as Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa, Hari and Upavarṣa are alluded to in later works. It is difficult to decide the date of Śabara. Dr. Ganganath Jha assigns him to 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which says that King Vikramāditya was the son of Śabara by a Kṣatriya-wife. Professor Hiriyanna notes his date as 400 A.D., which is accepted by the majority of scholars. The commentary of Śabara is the basis of the later Mīmāṃsā works.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has given his celebrated and independent exposition of the Śabara-bhāṣya in three parts known as Śloka-vārtika, Tantravārtika and Tūptikā. The Śloka-vārtika deals only with the philosophical portion of Śabara's work (the first chapter of the first book called Tarkapāda). Tantra-vārtika treats of the remaining three chapters of the Tarkapāda of Śabara, the second book and the third book. Tūptikā contains brief notes on the remaining nine books.

The next great Mīmāṃsā-scholar and follower of Kumārila is Pārthasārathi who has contributed his Śāstradīpikā, Tantraratna and Nyāya-ratna-mālā to this system. Amongst the followers of Kumārila the names of Sucitramiśra, the author of Kāśikā and Someśvara, the author Nyāyasudha deserve special mention.

Prabhākara, also called Guru, a disciple but a rival of Kumārila, did not have many followers. His work Bṛhatī is a valuable contribution to the system. Kumārila and Prabhākara were the last writers of whom the system could be proud of. The difference in the interpretations of the Śabara-bhāṣya by these two writers has resulted in a schism among the followers of the system, separating them into two

schools called Kaumārila-school and Prābhākara-school (also respectively called Bhāṭṭa-school and Guru-school). Artha-saṅgraha and Mīmāṃsā-paribhāṣā are the popular digests of this system.

Haribhadrāsūri introduces the Jaiminiyadarśana by referring to its atheistic character :

जैमिनीयाः पुनः प्राहुः सर्वज्ञादिविशेषणः ।

देवो न विद्यते कोऽपि यस्य मानं वचो भवेत्

॥ ६८ ॥

The Jaiminiyas say that there is no God characterised by omniscience, etc., whose words can be an authority. (68)

‘Sarvajñādiviśeṣaṇaḥ’—by ādi one should understand vibutva, nityatva, cidātmakatva, etc. God characterised by these is ruled out in this system as an unnecessary hypothesis—*nāsti sarvajñaḥ, pratyakṣādigocarātīkrāntatvāt śaśa śṛṅgavat*. The Mīmāṃsakas recognise neither creation (śṛṣṭi) nor dissolution (pralaya) of the universe as a whole. There was never a time when the world was other than what it is now—*na kadācidanidṛṣaṃ jagat*. Individual things come and go; that is due to the self-evolvent nature of reality. The past Karma of the selves stimulates such a change. This rules out the necessity of recognising God as the creator, protector and annihilator of the world. It is rather strange that this system which claims to be orthodox par excellence abolishes the idea of God.

This system emphasises the necessity of ascertaining the true significance of the eternal Vedic statements. In the words of Haribhadrāsūri:

तस्मादतीन्द्रियार्थानां साक्षाद्द्रष्टृभावतः ।

नित्येभ्यो वेदवाक्येभ्यो यथार्थत्वविनिश्चयः

॥ ६९ ॥

Therefore, as there is no direct cogniser of the supra-sensible values of life, the true significance of the eternal Vedic statements should be ascertained. (69)

As there is no ‘Prāmāṇika-puruṣa’ (God) the objects beyond the senses cannot be directly cognised. Dharma and Mokṣa are such supra-sensible values. They are only revealed by the Veda. God as the supreme Puruṣa, as the supreme authority, is ruled out. Hence the Veda is the supreme authority, because it is authorless and eternal. The ṛsis are the seers but not the authors of the Veda, which deals with Dharma and the objects denoted by it. The Dharma and the objects denoted by it are not known by perception, inference, comparison or any other means of valid knowledge. Veda alone is the authority for such supra-sensible values of life. Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Therefore to know the atīndriyārthas, the ascertainment of the true significance of the Veda is imperative. The Veda is broadly divided into Vidhivāda or injunctions and Arthavāda or explanations. The injunctions command us to do certain things and to refrain from certain things. Prohibitions are but injunctions in disguise. Explanations are the assertive propositions of the Veda which explain the injunctions of the Veda. Prabhākara thinks that all propositions should be injunctive. Assertive or explanatory propositions of the Veda are, according to him, authoritative only when they help persons to perform their duties.

The same is further emphasised :

अत एव पुरा कार्यो वेदपाठः प्रयत्नतः ।

ततो धर्मस्य जिज्ञासा कर्तव्या धर्मसाधनो

॥ ७० ॥

Hence the primary thing to be done is to study the Veda with all seriousness. Then an inquisition into Dharma, the means of merit, should be made. (70)

Dharmasādhani, sādhaniyapunyaopacayaḥ, i.e., the means by which the assemblage of merit is acquired. ‘Dharmasya jijñāsā’ is ‘dharmasādhani’.

What is Dharma? The answer is:

चोदनालक्षणो धर्मो चोदना तु क्रियां प्रति ।

प्रवर्तकं वचः प्राहुः स्वः कामोऽग्निं यजेद्यथा

॥ ७१ ॥

Dharma is of the nature of a command or injunction. Injunction is said to be words which impel men to action, such as 'He who desires heaven should worship fire'. (71)

Jaimini defines Dharma as a command or injunction which impels men to action—'Codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmah'. Dharma is the supreme duty, the 'categorical imperative'. It is like: 'Agni-hotram juhuyāt svargakāmah'.

Dharma is supra-sensible. It consists in the commands of the Veda. Action is the final import of the Veda. Actions performed here produce an unseen potency (Apūrva) in the soul of the agent. This Apūrva yields fruit when the obstructions are removed and the time becomes ripe for its fructification. Earlier Mīmāṃsakas believe in Dharma and their ideal was the attainment of heaven. But the later Mīmāṃsakas substitute the ideal of heaven by that of liberation (Mokṣa), which is a state of freedom from all pain, desire and consciousness.

Now the author speaks of the epistemology of the Mīmāṃsakas:

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शब्दश्चोपमया सह ।

अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च षट् प्रमाणानि जैमिनेः

॥ ७२ ॥

Perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, implication and negation—these are six Pramāṇas according to Jaimini. (72)

The term 'Jaimineh' should be taken as 'Jaiminī-yānam'. Jaimini admits only three Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda. Prabhākara adds two more—Upamāna and Arthāpatti. Kumārila adds one more to

the list—Abhāva. Thus according to the Mīmāṃsakas the Pramāṇas are six.

The definitions of these are given below:

तत्र प्रत्यक्षमक्षाणां संप्रयोगे सतां मतिः ।

आत्मनो बुद्धिजन्मेत्यनुमानं लैङ्गिकं पुनः

॥ ७३ ॥

शाब्दं शाश्वतवेदोत्थमुपमानं प्रकीर्तितम् ।

प्रसिद्धार्थस्य साधर्म्यादप्रसिद्धस्य भाजनम्

॥ ७४ ॥

दृष्टार्थानुपपत्त्या तु कस्याप्यर्थस्य कल्पना ।

क्रियते यद्वलेनासावर्थापत्तिरुदाहृता

॥ ७५ ॥

प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।

वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता

॥ ७६ ॥

Among them, Pratyakṣa (perception) is the apprehension arising from the proper contact of the defectless senses (with the objects). Anumāna (inference), again, is that knowledge arising from a probans, as it is born from the Perception by one's self. Śabda (verbal testimony) is that (knowledge) arising from the eternal Veda. Upamāna (analogy) is said to be apprehension of the unknown object on the basis of its similarity with a known object. Arthāpatti (implication) is that on whose strength an unperceived fact is assumed owing to the inconsistency of perceived facts. Where the pentad of Pramāṇas is not applicable in the case of a substance, there Abhāva (negation) is the authority to apprehend the existence of that substance. (73-76)

(1) Pratyakṣa—The Mīmāṃsakas broadly agree with the Nyāya in its conception of perception. Both the stages of perception, indeterminate and determinate, are admitted as in the Nyāya. Prabhākara defines perception as direct apprehension—'Sākṣāt prātītiḥ pratyakṣam'. Kumārila defines it as direct knowledge produced by the proper contact of the sense organs with the presented objects. The self

comes into contact with manas (mind) and manas with the sense-organ and the sense-organ with the external object. The differences of this system from the Nyāya in respect of perception are mainly two—(i) The auditory organ, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, proceeds from space (dik), while it is from ether (ākāśa) according to the Naiyāyikas. (ii) The nirvikalpaka (indeterminate), according to the Nyāya, is a stage inferred afterwards as a hypothesis to account for savi-kalpaka (determinate) perception. The Mīmāṃsaka regards it as a part of normal experience. It is a vague, indefinite and primitive stage of perception, in which there is the awareness of 'that' without its relation to 'what'.

(2) Anumāna—The Jaiminiya system generally agrees with Nyāya in the conception of this Pramāṇa. It differs from the Nyāya in respect of number of syllogistic premises. It believes that only three members of a syllogism, either the first three or the last three, are enough. The Nyāya postulates five.

(3) Śābda—This pramāṇa has great importance in the Mīmāṃsā. Testimony is the knowledge of the supra-sensible values which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumārila divides Śābda into impersonal (Apauruṣeya) and personal (Pauruṣeya), the former being the testimony of the Veda (Veda-vākya) and the latter the testimony of a trustworthy person (Āptavākya). Prabhākara admits only Vedic testimony as real testimony, and reduces human testimony to inference.

(4) Upamāna—The view of the Mīmāṃsakas in regard to this Pramāṇa differs from that of the Naiyāyikas. According to the Naiyāyikas, comparison is the knowledge of the relation between the word and the object denoted by the word (saṃjñāsaṃjñīsaṃbandhajñāna). But it is, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the knowledge of an unknown object like 'gavaya' on the basis of its similarity with a known object like 'gauḥ'.

(5) Arthāpatti—Unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas admit Arthāpatti (implication) as an independent means of valid knowledge. It consists in the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts. For instance—'Pino Devadattaḥ' and 'Divā na bhūṅkte' are the inconsistent perceived facts. We have to assume an unperceived fact like 'rātribhojana' to reconcile between them.

(6) Abhāva—This is otherwise known as non-apprehension (Anupalabdhi). Kumārila admits this as a separate Pramāṇa, while the Naiyāyikas and Prabhākara reject it. Kumārila admits negative fact (Abhāva) like the Naiyāyikas. But unlike the Naiyāyikas, he formulates a separate Pramāṇa for knowing abhāvapadārthas. The word 'anupalabdhi' means the absence of knowledge derived from any of the five fore-going Pramāṇas. That is, knowledge got through any of the above five Pramāṇas points to the existence of objects (bhāva). The absence of such knowledge indicates their non-existence (abhāva). An abhāva like ghaṭābhāva somewhere is known through this Pramāṇa.

Now the author concludes his summary of the Jaiminiya system:

जैमिनीयमतस्यापि संक्षेपोऽयं निवेदितः ।
एवमास्ति कवादानां कृतं संक्षेपकीर्तनम्

॥ ७७ ॥

The abstract of the Jaiminiya system too is here given. Thus the summary of the orthodox systems is given. (77)

Āstikavādānam—Paralokagatipuṇyapāpāstikyavādinām—the systems which recognise the existence of the other world, liberation, merit and sin. The Bauddha, the Naiyāyika, the Sāṅkhya, the Jaina, the Vaiśeṣika and the Jaiminiya systems are meant here.

7. CĀRVĀKA-DARŚANA

The Cārvāka seems to be a very old system. References to it are found in epics and early Buddhist literature. Garbe has rightly remarked that 'several vestiges show that even in pre-Buddhist India proclaimers of purely materialistic doctrines appeared'. (The philosophy of Ancient India, p. 26). This system might have arisen as a protest against the excesses of priestly practices, the idealism of the Upaniṣads beyond the reach of commoners, the political and social crises of that age, the exploitation of the masses by petty rulers, monks and aristocrats and lust and greed in the unstable society in that post-Upaniṣadic and pre-Buddhistic age. Yet it did not establish itself as a force. It 'originated from discontent and disappeared in serious thought.'

Tradition makes Bṛhaspati the founder of the Cārvāka school, also called Lokāyata system. (Maitrī-Upaniṣad vii. 9). His sūtra-work is lost. No original work on the system is available, except a much later work Tattvopaplava-siṃha of Jayarāṣibhaṭṭa. Our chief sources of this system are the works of rival schools. Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha of Mādhava gives a summary based perhaps on the accounts found in the rival schools. Of the other sources may be mentioned Prabodhacandrodaya of Kṛṣṇamīśra, II. Act. The orthodox systems regard this system as 'Nāstika-śīromani'.

The main tenets of this system along with the sūtras of Bṛhaspati quoted in various philosophical writings are given below:

(1) Earth, water, fire and air are the four elements—'Pṛthivyaptejovāyuriti tattvāni'.

(2) Bodies, senses and objects are the results of the different combinations of the elements—'Tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviśayasamjñā'.

(3) Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast—'Kiṇvā-dibhyo madaśaktivad-vijñānam'.

(4) Soul is nothing but conscious body—'Caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ'.

(5) Enjoyment is the only end of human life—'Kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ'.

(6) Death itself is liberation—'Maraṇamevāpavargaḥ'.

Haribhadrāsūri holds forth an apology for including the Cārvāka-darśana in his treatment:

नैयायिकमतादन्ये भेदं वैशेषिकैः सह ।

न मन्यन्ते मते तेषां पञ्चैवास्तिकवादिनः

॥ ७८ ॥

षड्दर्शनसंख्या तु पूर्यते तन्मते किल ।

लोकायतमताक्षेपात्कथ्यते तेन तन्मतम्

॥ ७९ ॥

Some do not recognise the Vaiśeṣika system as distinct from the Naiyāyika system. In their opinion there are only five orthodox systems. According to them, however, the total of six Darśanas is made up by including the Lokāyata (Cārvāka) system. Hence, that system is now explained. (78-79)

The author now refers to the atheistic stand of the Lokāyatas:

लोकायता वदन्त्येवं नास्ति देवो न निर्वृतिः ।

धर्मधर्मौ न विद्येते न फलं पुण्यपापयोः

॥ ८० ॥

The Materialists say that there is no God, no liberation, no merit and demerit, and no fruits of merit and sin. (80)

The Materialists reject the soul, the God, and the hereafter, which are not perceived, but are only inferred.

When all this does not exist, what then exists?

The answer they give is:

एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावान् इन्द्रियगोचरः ।

भद्रे ! वृक्षपदं पश्य यद्वदन्ति बहुश्रुताः

॥ ८१ ॥

The extent of the world is as much as comes within the purview of the senses. What the learned say about it is like saying 'Good Lady ! Look this is the paw of a wolf.' (81)

'Bhadre! vṛkapadam paśya, etc.'—A certain lady had the curiosity to see the paw of a wolf. Her lover drew a diagram of the wolf's paw and said, 'Look, good lady, this is the paw of a wolf'. The innocent lady was made by her crafty lover to believe that it was the paw of a wolf. Similar is the craft of those, whom the Materialists call 'religion-clad rogues' (dharmacchadmadhūrtāḥ). The charge that the materialists level against the orthodox people is that they being skilled in hoodwinking others throw the innocent people into confusion regarding bhakṣya and abhakṣya, gamya and agamya, heya and upādeya, etc., by holding forth a temptation of the enjoyment of pleasure on attaining heaven and the like through the means of inference, verbal testimony, etc.

Therefore the materialists say:

पिब खाद च जातशोभने ! यदतीतं वरगात्रि ! तन्न ते ।

न हि भीरु ! गतं निवर्तते समुदयमात्रमिदं कलेवरम्

॥ ८२ ॥

O good lady ! drink and eat; what is beyond you, O beautiful lady, is not for you. O timid one, what is lost cannot be regained. This body is but the aggregate (of the four elements). (82)

Piba—peyāpeyanirapekṣayā madirādikaṃ piba, adharā-dikaṃ vā. Khāda—bhakṣyābhakṣyanirapekṣayā māmsādikaṃ khāda, bhogādyupabhogaṃ vā kuru. Yadatītam—svargādikaṃ. Gatam na nivartate—sukhayauvanādikaṃ gatam na parāvartate—What is past will not come back. Some say that it will come to you in the other world. But the other world itself does not exist. Do not take the trouble of performing penance, nor torture yourself by rigorous practices; for attaining something which does not exist.

Samudayamātramidaṃ kalevaram—This body is nothing but the aggregate of four elements, which are mentioned in the next stanza:

किं च पृथ्वी जलं तेजो वायुर्भूतचतुष्टयम् ।

चेतन्यभूमिरेतेषां मानं त्वक्षजमेव हि

॥ ८३ ॥

Further, earth, water, fire and air constitute the quartet of elements which is the source of consciousness. To these (Cārvākas) perception alone is the Pramāṇa. (83)

This stanza curtly sums up the ontology and the epistemology of the Materialists. The Cārvākas admit the existence of four elements, earth, water, fire and air. They reject ether (Ākāśa) because it is not perceived but inferred. The soul, the God and the Paraloka are rejected. Their view is that everything that exists including the mind, is due to a particular combination of these four elements.

Consciousness, too, is regarded as a mere product of matter—bhūtacatuṣṭayameva caitanyabhūmih (caitanyasya utpattikāraṇam). Consciousness is produced when these elements combine in a certain proportion. The soul is nothing but the body with consciousness—Caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ. Caitanya or Manas is found associated with the body. It vanishes when the body disintegrates.

The state of consciousness is described as:

पृथ्व्यादिभूतसहत्यां तथा देहादिसम्भवः ।

मदशक्तिः सुराङ्गेभ्यो यद्वत्तद्वत्स्थिताऽऽत्मता

॥ ८४ ॥

Thus when the four elements, earth, etc., combine, there is the production of the body, etc. Just as there is the intoxicating power from the ingredients of wine, so is consciousness (from the elements of the body). (84)

Madaśaktiḥ, etc. — “guḍadhātakyaḍibhyo madyāṅgebhyo madaśaktirunmāḍakatvaṃ bhavati yadvat tadvat bhūta-catuṣṭayasambandhāt śarīra ātmātā sthitā sacetanatvaṃ jātam”. Caitanya or consciousness arises from matter just as the intoxicating quality of wine arises from fermented yeast — ‘Kiṇvāḍibhyo madaśaktivad vijñānam’. Thus consciousness is a by-product of matter. The so-called soul is nothing but conscious living body.

The epistemological doctrine of the Cārvākas (Stanza 83) is that Pratyakṣa is the only means of valid knowledge. Even inference is rejected. It is said to be a mere leap in the dark. Deductive inference is vitiated by the principle of *petitio principii* and inductive inference is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. Therefore, they say, the logicians find themselves stuck up in the mud of inference : “Viśeṣe, nugamābhāvāt, sāmānye siddhasādhanaāt. Anumābhaṅgapaṅke, smin nimagnā vāḍi-dantinaḥ.”

Now the author refers to the doctrine of the Cārvākas declaring that it is foolish to go after what is not seen :

तस्माद् दृष्टपरित्यागाददृष्टे च प्रवर्तनम् ।

लोकस्य तद्विमृष्टत्वं चार्वाकाः प्रतिपेदिरे

॥ ८५ ॥

Therefore the Cārvākas have declared that it is foolish to search for the unseen after discarding what is seen. (85)

That ‘sukha’ here which can be directly experienced from objects of various kind, is ‘dṛṣṭa’. That ‘sukha’ hereafter which should be attained through penance and such

other rigorous means, is ‘adṛṣṭa’. It is foolish to discard what is here and aspire for what is hereafter.

The author now refers to another stand of the Cārvākas :

साध्यावृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यां या प्रीतिर्जायते जने ।

निरर्था सा मता तेषां सा चाकाशात् परा न हि

॥ ८६ ॥

That pleasure which arises in men by virtue of the acquisition of what is desirable or rejection of what is not desirable, is, according to the Cārvākas, futile; it is not at all different from ether. (86)

Sādhyaṣya — abhiṣṭasya anabhiṣṭasya vā āvṛttinivṛtti-bhyām, arthāt abhiṣṭasya prāptyā anabhiṣṭasya abhāvatayā, yatsukhaṃ jane jāyate tannirarthakam, tasya ākāśavat śūnyasvarūpatvāt.

The author concludes his epitome of the Cārvāka system :

लोकायतमतेऽप्येवं संक्षेपोऽयं निवेदितः ।

अभिधेयतात्पर्यायः पर्यालोच्यः सुबुद्धिभिः

॥ ८७ ॥

Thus the summary of the Lokāyata system, too, is presented. The meaning and import of this may be thought of by the wise. (87)

The author now has to follow stand of the Court.

all different from other, (see)

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Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.

The author concludes his opinion of the Chinese system:

॥ ॐ ॥

Thus the summary of the Lokayan system too is presented. The meaning and import of this may be thought of by the reader. (87)

षड्दर्शनसमुच्चयकारिकासङ्ग्रहः

सद्दर्शनं जिनं नत्वा वीरं स्याद्वाददेशकम् ।

सर्वदर्शनवाच्योऽर्थः संक्षेपेण निगद्य . ॥ १ ॥

दर्शनानि षडेवात्र मूलभेदव्यपेक्षया ।

देवतातत्त्वभेदेन ज्ञातव्यानि मनीषिभिः ॥ २ ॥

बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा ।

जैमिनीयं च नामानि दर्शनानाममून्यहो ॥ ३ ॥

तत्र बौद्धमते तावद्देवता सुगतः किल ।

चतुर्णामार्यसत्यानां दुःखादीनां प्ररूपकः ॥ ४ ॥

दुःखं संसारिणः स्कन्धास्ते पञ्च प्रकीर्तिताः ।

विज्ञानं वेदना संज्ञा संस्कारो रूपमेव च ॥ ५ ॥

समुदेति यतो लोके रागादीनां गणोऽखिलः

आत्मात्मीयस्वभावाख्यः समुदयः स संमतः ॥ ६ ॥

क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा इत्येवं वासना तु या ।

स मार्ग इति विज्ञेयो निरोधो मोक्ष उच्यते ॥ ७ ॥

पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि शब्दाद्या विषयाः पञ्च मानसम्

धर्मायतनमेतानि द्वादशायतनानि च ॥ ८

प्रमाणे द्वे च विज्ञेये तथा सौगतदर्शने ।

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च सम्यग्ज्ञानं द्विधा यतः ॥ ९

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढमभ्रान्तं तत्र बुध्यताम् ।

त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतो लिङ्गिज्ञानं त्वनुमानसंज्ञितम् ॥ १०

रूपाणि पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे विद्यमानता ।	
विपक्षे नास्तिता हेतोरेवं त्रीणि विभाव्यन्ताम्	॥ ११ ॥
बौद्धराद्धान्तवाच्यस्य संक्षेपोऽयं निवेदितः ।	
नैयायिकमतस्येतः कथ्यमानो निशम्यताम्	॥ १२ ॥
अक्षपादमते देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः ।	
विभुनित्यैकसर्वज्ञो नित्यबुद्धिसमाश्रयः	॥ १३ ॥
तत्त्वानि शोडशामुत्र प्रमाणादीनि तद्यथा ।	
प्रमाणं च प्रमेयं च संशयश्च प्रयोजनम्	॥ १४ ॥
दृष्टान्तोऽप्यथ सिद्धान्तोऽवयवस्तर्कनिर्णयो ।	
वादो जल्पो वितण्डा च हेत्वाभासाश्छलानि च	॥ १५ ॥
जातयो निग्रहस्थानान्येषामेवं प्ररूपणा ।	
अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः स्यात्प्रमाणं तच्चतुर्विधम्	॥ १६ ॥
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं चोपमानं शाब्दिकं तथा ।	
तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नमव्यभिचारिकम्	॥ १७ ॥
व्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं व्यपदेशविर्वाजितम् ।	
प्रत्यक्षमितरन्मानं तत्पूर्वं त्रिविधं भवेत्	॥ १८ ॥
पूर्ववच्छेषवच्चैव दृष्टं सामान्यतस्तथा ।	
तत्राद्यं कारणात्कार्यमनुमानमिह गीयते	॥ १९ ॥
रोलम्बगबलव्यालतमालमलिनत्वेषः ।	
वृष्टि व्यभिचरन्तीह नैवंप्रायाः पयोमुचः	॥ २० ॥
कार्यात्कारणानुमानं यच्च तच्छेषवन्मतम् ।	
तथाविधनदीपुरान्मेघो वृष्टो यथोपरि	॥ २१ ॥
यच्च सामान्यतो दृष्टं तदेवं गतिपूर्विका ।	
पुंसि देशान्तरप्राप्तिर्यथा सूर्योऽपि सा तथा	॥ २२ ॥

प्रसिद्धवस्तुसाधर्म्यादप्रसिद्धस्य साधनम् ।	
उपमानं समाख्यातं यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा	॥ २३ ॥
शाब्दमाप्तोपदेशस्तु मानमेवं चतुर्विधम् ।	
प्रमेयं चात्मदेहार्थबुद्धीन्द्रियसुखादि च	॥ २४ ॥
किमेतदिति सन्दिग्धः प्रत्ययः संशयो मतः ।	
प्रवर्तते यदर्थित्वात्तत्तु साध्यं प्रयोजनम्	॥ २५ ॥
दृष्टान्तस्तु भवेदेष विवादविषयो न यः ।	
सिद्धान्तस्तु चतुर्भेदः सर्वतन्त्रादिभेदतः	॥ २६ ॥
प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तोपनया निगमस्तथा ।	
अवयवाः पञ्च तर्कः संशयोपरमो भवेत्	॥ २७ ॥
यथा काकादिसम्पातात् स्थानुना भाव्यमत्र हि ।	
ऊर्ध्वं सन्देहतर्काभ्यां प्रत्ययो निर्णयो मतः	॥ २८ ॥
आचार्यशिष्ययोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहात् ।	
यः कथाभ्यासहेतुः स्यादसौ वाद उदाहृतः	॥ २९ ॥
विजिगीषुकथा या तु छलजात्यादिदूषणम् ।	
स जल्पः, सा वितण्डा तु प्रतिपक्षविर्वाजिता	॥ ३० ॥
हेत्वाभासा असिद्धाद्याश्छलं कूपो नवोदकः ।	
जातयो दूषणाभासाः पक्षादिदूष्यते न यः	॥ ३१ ॥
निग्रहस्थानमाख्यातं परो येन निगृह्यते ।	
प्रतिज्ञाहानिसंन्यासविरोधादिविभेदवत्	॥ ३२ ॥
नैयायिकमतस्यैवं समासः कथितोऽधुना ।	
सांख्याभिमतभावानामिदानीमयमुच्यते	॥ ३३ ॥
एतेषां या समावस्था सा प्रकृतिः किलोच्यते ।	
प्रधानाव्यक्तशब्दाभ्यां वाच्या नित्यस्वरूपिका	॥ ३४ ॥

॥ ४४ ॥	सांख्या निरीश्वरा केचित्केचिदीश्वरदेवताः । सर्वेषामपि तेषां स्यात्तत्त्वानां पञ्चविंशतिः ॥ ३५ ॥
॥ ४५ ॥	सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्चेति ज्ञेयं तावद्गुणत्रयम् । प्रसादतोषदैव्यादिकार्यलिङ्गं क्रमेण तत् ॥ ३६ ॥
॥ ४६ ॥	ततः सञ्जायते बुद्धिर्भहानिति यकोच्यते । अहंकारस्ततोऽपि स्यात्तस्मात्षोडशको गणः ॥ ३७ ॥
॥ ४७ ॥	स्पर्शनं रसनं घ्राणं चक्षुः श्रोत्रं च पञ्चमम् । पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाण्याहुस्तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाणि च ॥ ३८ ॥
॥ ४८ ॥	पायूपस्थवचःपाणिपादाख्यानि मनस्तथा । अन्यानि पञ्चरूपाणि तन्मात्राणीति षोडश ॥ ३९ ॥
॥ ४९ ॥	रूपात्तेजो रसादापो गन्धाद्भूमिः स्वरात्तमः । स्पर्शाद्वायुस्तथैवं च पञ्चभ्यो भूतपञ्चकम् ॥ ४० ॥
॥ ५० ॥	एवं चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वरूपं निवेदितं सांख्यमते प्रधानम् । अन्यस्त्वकर्ता विगुणस्तु भोक्ता पुमान्नित्यचिदभ्युपेतः ॥ ४१ ॥
॥ ५१ ॥	पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि सांख्यस्यैवं भवन्ति च । प्रधाननरयोश्चात्र वृत्तिः पङ्ग्वन्धयोरिव ॥ ४२ ॥
॥ ५२ ॥	प्रकृतिवियोगो मोक्षः पुरुषस्यैवान्तरज्ञानात् । मानत्रितयं च भवेत् प्रत्यक्षं लैङ्गिकं शाब्दम् ॥ ४३ ॥
॥ ५३ ॥	एवं सांख्यमतस्यापि समासः कथितोऽधुना । जैनदर्शनसंक्षेपः कथ्यते सुविचारवान् ॥ ४४ ॥
॥ ५४ ॥	जिनेन्द्रो देवता तत्र रागद्वेषविवर्जितः । हृतमोहमहामल्लः केवलज्ञानदर्शनः ॥ ४५ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	सुरासुरेन्द्रसम्पूज्यः सद्भूतार्थोपदेशकः । कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयं कृत्वा सम्प्राप्तः परमं पदम् ॥ ४६ ॥

॥ ५६ ॥	जीवाजीवौ तथा पुण्यं पापमाश्रवसंवरौ । बन्धश्च निर्जरामोक्षौ नव तत्त्वानि तन्मते ॥ ४७ ॥
॥ ५७ ॥	तत्र ज्ञानादिधर्मभ्यो भिन्नाभिन्नो विवृतिमान् । कर्ता शुभाशुभं कर्म भोक्ता कर्मफलस्य च ॥ ४८ ॥
॥ ५८ ॥	चैतन्यलक्षणो जीवो यश्चैतद्विपरीत्यवान् । अजीवः स समाख्यातः पुण्यं सत्कर्मपुद्गलाः ॥ ४९ ॥
॥ ५९ ॥	पापं तद्विपरीतं तु मिथ्यात्वाद्याश्च हेतवः । यस्तैर्बन्धः स विज्ञेय आश्रवो जिनशासने ॥ ५० ॥
॥ ६० ॥	संवरस्तन्निरोधस्तु बन्धो जीवस्य कर्मणः । अन्योन्यानुगमात्कर्मसम्बन्धो यो द्वयोरपि ॥ ५१ ॥
॥ ६१ ॥	बद्धस्य कर्मणः शाटो यस्तु सा निर्जरा मता । आत्यन्तिको वियोगस्तु देहादेर्मोक्ष उच्यते ॥ ५२ ॥
॥ ६२ ॥	एतानि तत्र तत्त्वानि यः श्रद्धते स्थिराशयः । सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयोगेन तस्य चारित्र्ययोग्यता ॥ ५३ ॥
॥ ६३ ॥	तथा भव्यत्वपाकेन यस्यैतत् त्रितयं भवेत् । सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रियायोगाज्जायते मोक्षभाजनम् ॥ ५४ ॥
॥ ६४ ॥	प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्वे प्रमाणे तथा मते । अनन्तधर्मकं वस्तु प्रमाणविषयस्त्विह ॥ ५५ ॥
॥ ६५ ॥	अपरोक्षतयाऽर्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् । प्रत्यक्षमितरज्ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया ॥ ५६ ॥
॥ ६६ ॥	येनोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं यत्तत्सदिष्यते । अनन्तधर्मकं वस्तु तेनोक्तं मानगोचरः ॥ ५७ ॥
॥ ६७ ॥	जैनदर्शनसंक्षेप इत्येष कथितोऽनघः । पूर्वापरविघातस्तु यत्र क्वापि न विद्यते ॥ ५८ ॥

॥ ५४ ॥	देवताविषये भेदो नास्ति नैयायिकैः समम् । वैशेषिकाणां तत्त्वेषु विद्यतेऽसौ निर्विद्यते	॥ ५९ ॥
॥ ५४ ॥	द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म सामान्यं च चतुर्थकम् । विशेषसमवायौ च तत्त्वषट्कं हि तन्मते	॥ ६० ॥
॥ ५४ ॥	तत्र द्रव्यं नवधा भूजलतेजोऽनिलान्तरिक्षाणि । कालदिगात्मनांसि च, गुणाः पुनश्चतुर्विंशतिधा	॥ ६१ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	स्पर्शरूपगन्धाः शब्दः सङ्ख्याविभागसंयोगौ । परिमाणं च पृथक्त्वं तथा परत्वापरत्वे च	॥ ६२ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	बुद्धिः सुखदुःखेच्छा धर्माधर्मौ प्रयत्नसंस्कारौ । द्वेषः स्नेहगुरुत्वे द्रवत्ववेगौ गुणा एते	॥ ६३ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	उत्क्षेपावक्षेपावाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनम् । पञ्चविधं कर्मेतत्परापरे द्वे तु सामान्ये	॥ ६४ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	तत्र परं सत्तात्थ्यं द्रव्यत्वाद्यपरं अथ विशेषस्तु । निश्चयतो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिरन्त्यो विनिर्दिष्टः	॥ ६५ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	य इहायुतसिद्धानामाधाराधेयभूतभावानाम् । सम्बन्ध इह-प्रत्ययहेतुः प्रोक्तः स समवायः	॥ ६६ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	प्रमाणं च द्विधाऽमीषां प्रत्यक्षं लैङ्गिकं तथा । वैशेषिकमतस्यैवं संक्षेपः परिकीर्तितः	॥ ६७ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	जैमिनीयाः पुनः प्राहुः सर्वज्ञादिविशेषणः । देवो न विद्यते कोऽपि यस्य मानं वचो भवेत्	॥ ६८ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	तस्मादतीन्द्रियार्थानां साक्षाद्द्रष्टुरभावतः । नित्येभ्यो वेदवाक्येभ्यो यथार्थत्वविनिश्चयः	॥ ६९ ॥
॥ ५५ ॥	अत एव पुरा कार्यो वेदपाठः प्रयत्नतः । ततो धर्मस्य जिज्ञासा कर्तव्या धर्मसाधना	॥ ७० ॥

॥ ७१ ॥	चोदनालक्षणो धर्मो चोदना तु क्रियां प्रति । प्रवर्तकं वचः प्राहुः स्वः कामोऽग्निं यजेद्यथा	॥ ७१ ॥
॥ ७२ ॥	प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शब्दश्चोपमया सह । अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च षट् प्रमाणानि जैमिनेः	॥ ७२ ॥
॥ ७३ ॥	तत्र प्रत्यक्षमक्षाणां संप्रयोगे सतां मतिः । आत्मनो बुद्धिजन्मेत्यनुमानं लैङ्गिकं पुनः	॥ ७३ ॥
॥ ७४ ॥	शाब्दं शाश्वतवेदोत्थमुपमानं प्रकीर्तितम् । प्रसिद्धार्थस्य साधर्म्यादप्रसिद्धस्य भाजनम्	॥ ७४ ॥
॥ ७५ ॥	दृष्टार्थानुपपत्त्या तु कस्याप्यर्थस्य कल्पना । क्रियते यद्वलेनासावर्थापत्तिरुदाहृता	॥ ७५ ॥
॥ ७६ ॥	प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते । वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता	॥ ७६ ॥
॥ ७७ ॥	जैमिनीयमतस्यापि संक्षेपोऽयं निवेदितः । एवमास्तिकवादानां कृतं संक्षेपकीर्तनम्	॥ ७७ ॥
॥ ७८ ॥	नैयायिकमतादन्ये भेदं वैशेषिकैः सह । न मन्यन्ते मते तेषां पञ्चैवास्तिकवादिनः	॥ ७८ ॥
॥ ७९ ॥	षड्दर्शनसंख्या तु पूर्यते तन्मते किल । लोकायतमताक्षेपात्कथ्यते तेन तन्मतम्	॥ ७९ ॥
॥ ८० ॥	लोकायता वदन्त्येवं नास्ति देवो न निर्वृतिः । धर्माधर्मौ न विद्यते न फलं पुण्यपापयोः	॥ ८० ॥
॥ ८१ ॥	एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावान् इन्द्रियगोचरः । भद्रे ! वृकपदं पश्य यद्वदन्ति बहुश्रुताः	॥ ८१ ॥
॥ ८२ ॥	पिब खाद च जातशोभने ! यदतीतं वरगात्रि ! तन्न ते । न हि भीह ! गतं निवर्तते समुदयमात्रमिदं कलेवरम्	॥ ८२ ॥

किं च पृथ्वी जलं तेजो वायुर्भूतचतुष्टयम् । चैतन्यभूमिरेतेषां मानं त्वक्षजमेव हि	॥ ८३ ॥
पृथ्व्यादिभूतसंहत्यां तथा देहादिसम्भवः । मदशक्तिः सुराङ्गेभ्यो यद्वत्तद्वत्स्थिताऽऽत्मता	॥ ८४ ॥
तस्माद् दृष्टपरित्यागाददृष्टे च प्रवर्तनम् । लोकस्य तद्विमूढत्वं चार्वाकाः प्रतिपेदिरे	॥ ८५ ॥
साध्यावृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यां या प्रीतिर्जायते जने । निरर्था सा मता तेषां सा चाकाशात् परा न हि	॥ ८६ ॥
लोकायतमतेऽप्येवं संक्षेपोऽयं निवेदितः । अभिधेयतात्पर्यार्थः पर्यालोच्यः सुबुद्धिभिः	॥ ८७ ॥

Sanskrit Works Referred to in the Notes

1. *Ṣaḍ-darśanasamuccaya* with Maṇibhadra's commentary.
2. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Diṇnāga.
3. *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti.
4. *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama with Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*.
5. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭīkā* of Vācaspatimiśra.
6. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana.
7. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvakaumudī*.
8. *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra.
9. *Nyāyavatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara.
10. *Ānyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* of Hemacandra with *Syādvādamañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa.
11. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra.
12. *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda with Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya*, *Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha*.
13. *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa.
14. *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of Jaimini with Śabarāsvāmin's *Bhāṣya*.
15. *Jaiminīyanyāyamālā* of Mādhavācārya.
16. *Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya.